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COVMENTS
SECTION 14 OF THE LANHAM ACT-FTC AUTHORITY TO
CHALLENGE GENERIC TRADEMARKS
INTRODUCTION
Section 14' of the Lanham Trademark Act 2 allows persons who believe that
they are or will be damaged by a mark3 registered on the principal register4 to
petition the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB)s to cancel the regis-
tration. 6 In addition, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) may petition for
cancellation on one of several grounds enumerated in section 14.7 On May 31,
1. Lanhan Act § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1976).
2. Id. §§ 1-45, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976). The Lanham Act provides for the federal
registration of trademarks, service marks, collective marks, and certification marks. Although
registration confers various benefits upon the owner of the mark, it does not establish trademark
rights. See Turner v. H M H Publishing Co., 380 F.2d 224, 228 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
1006 (1967). Rights can be established only through actual use. United Drug Co. v. Theodore
Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918); Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413
(1916). The advantages of a federal registration are, inter alia: (1) a registration provides
constructive notice of the registrants claim of ownership, Lanham Act § 22, IS U.S.C. § 1072
(1976); (2) a registration is prima facie evidence of the validity of the mark, the registrants
ownership of the mark, and his exclusive right to use the mark in commerce, id. § 7(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1057(b) (1976); (3) if a registration becomes incontestable pursuant to § 15 of the Lanham Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1976), it becomes conclusive evidence of the registrants exclusive right to use
the mark, subject to several defenses, id. § 33(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (1976); (4) the registration
may be recorded with the U.S. Treasury Department to bar imports bearing an infringing
trademark from entering the country. Id. § 42, 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1976),
3. A mark "includes any trade-mark, service mark, collective mark, or certification mark
entitled to registration [under the Lanham Act]." Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1976).
Throughout this Comment consideration will be given mainly to trademarks.
4. The Lanham Act established a principal register, see id. §§ 1-22, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1072
(1976), and a supplemental register, see id. §§ 23-28, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1091-1096 (1976). When a
mark is not eligible for registration on the principal register but can distinguish the owner's goods
or services it can be registered on the supplemental register. Id. § 23, IS U.S.C. § 1091 (1976).
Canceliation of registrations on the supplemental register will not be discussed in this Comment.
5. Section 17 of the Lanham Act provides that petitions for cancellation should be filed with
the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) of the United States Patent Office. Id. § 17, 15
U.S.C. § 1067 (1976).
6. If the TTAB determines that a registration should be cancelled, § 18 empowers the
Commissioner of Patents to do so. Id. § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 1068 (1976).
7. Id. § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 1064. The applicable portion of § 14 states: "Prov'ided, That the
Federal Trade Commission may apply to cancel on the grounds specified in subsections (c) and (e)
of this section any mark registered on the principal register established by this chapter, and the
prescribed fee shall not be required." Id. [hereinafter referred to as the FTC proviso]. Among the
grounds for cancellation available to the FTC are that the mark has been abandoned, the
registration was obtained fraudulently, or the mark has become the common descriptive name of
a product, a generic term. Id. § 14(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1976). It should be noted that
although the FTC proviso states that the FTC may apply to cancel a "mark," it can only seek
cancellation of a registration. See Formica Corp. v. Lefkowitz, 590 F.2d 915, 917 n.4 (C.C.P.A.),
cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2838 (1979).
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1978, the FTC exercised this section 14 power s when it applied for the cancel-
lation of the FORMICA registration. 9 It alleged that the term FORMICA had
become the common descriptive name'0 for "laminated sheets of wood, fabric
or paper impregnated with synthetic resin and consolidated under heat and
pressure for use on table tops, furniture and wall panelling."" This petition
8. This was only the sixth such action brought by the FTC. In FTC v. Elder Mfg. Co., 84
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 429 (Comm'r Pat. 1950) (filed on ground of abandonment), the Commissioner of
Patents held that the FTC lacked standing to petition to cancel a registration issued under the
Trade-Mark Act of 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724, and reregistered under the Lanham Act.
Similarly, in FTC v. Royal Mfg. Co., 84 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 429 (Comm'r Pat. 1950) (filed on
grounds that registration was fraudulently obtained), the Commissioner held that the FTC lacked
standing to challenge a registration issued under the 1905 Act. The FTC did successfully cancel
two registrations, without opposition, on the ground of abandonment, FTC v. Service Seed Co.,
Cancellation No. 7478 (T.T.A.B., filed May 2, 1960); FTC v. Danne, Cancellation No. 7152
(Comm'r Pat., filed Aug. 5, 1958), as well as one registration on the grounds that It had been
fraudulently obtained. Bart Schwartz Int'l Textiles, Ltd. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 665 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
9. FTC v. Formica Corp., Cancellation No. 11955 (T.T.A.B., filed May 31, 1978). Accord-
ing to Alfred Dougherty, the Director of the FTC's Bureau of Competition, both parties discussed
settling the matter before the petition was filed. The Formica Corporation voluntarily cancelled
its 1963 registration but not the registration obtained under the Trade-Mark Act of 1905, ch. 592,
33 Stat. 724, and republished under the Lanham Act. This action, however, "had no practical
effect on the company's rights as a registrant or the status of the trademark, except to deprive tie
FTC of the clearest basis for standing to petition to cancel [the registration]." Hearings on H.R.
3685 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as Hearings
(statement of Alfred Dougherty at 21) (This material 2s not yet available in published form.
Statements of persons appearing before the subcommittee are on file with the Fordham Law
Review); see [1979] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) § A, at 15-16 (Oct. 25); id. § A, at 20-21
(Oct. 18) (news summaries of hearings on H.R. 3685). Soon after the petition to cancel was filed,
Formica moved to dismiss on the grounds that the FTC lacked standing to petition to cancel a
registration that was obtained under the 1905 Act and republished under the Lanham Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976). The TTAB overruled FTC v. Elder Mfg, Co., 84 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
429 (Comm'r Pat. 1950), see note 8 supra, and denied Formica's motion. FTC v. Formica Corp.,
200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 182, 191 (T.T.A.B. 1978) The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
(CCPA) refused to issue a writ of mandamus, Formica Corp. v. Lefkowitz, 590 F.2d 915
(C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2838 (1979), and the case is still pending. Because the CCPA
considered only the propriety of issuing a writ of mandamus, the question of the FTC's standing
will be reconsidered if the case is appealed at the close of the TTAB proceedings.
10. The common descriptive name of a product is a term of art used in the Lanham Act to
define a generic name. See Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Sidney Diamond at 21). TIlls
Comment will use both terms.
11. Petition for Cancellation at 1, FTC v. Formica Corp., Cancellation No. 11955 (T.T.A.B.,
filed May 31, 1978). This is the description of the goods associated with the FORMICA
trademark. Throughout this Comment, they will be referred to collectively as plastic laminates.
The current proceeding is not the first in which the Formica Corporation has faced the possible
cancellation of its trademark on these grounds. In 1966, Formica opposed the registration of the
mark NEW-MICA by the Newnan Corporation on the grounds that it was confusingly similar to
its own registered mark. Newnan counterclaimed for cancellation on the grounds that FORMICA
had become generic, but the TTAB denied the counterclaim. Formica Corp. v. Newnan Corp.,
149 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 585 (T.T.A.B. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 396 F.2d 486 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
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represented the FTC's first attempt to cancel a registration solely on the
grounds that the trademark had become a generic word. It was also the first
time that the FTC used its section 14 authority against a relatively famous
trademark. 12
The FTC's initiative has elicited negative reactions from businessmen and
commentators who view the action against FORMICA as part of a conscious
policy to eradicate the function of trademarks in the economy. 1 3 Eventually,
these reactions prompted the introduction of legislation to limit the FTC's
authority under the Lanham Act. In April, 1979, Representative Maguire in-
troduced H.R. 368514 to amend section 14 by prohibiting the FTC from peti-
tioning to cancel a registration solely on the grounds that a mark has become
a generic term."5 Later that year, the House passed the FTC authorization
bill, 16 which would severely curtail all facets of the Commission's activities.
7
In particular, section 304 prohibits the use of authorized funds to petition to
cancel a registration on the grounds of genericness alone.18 This restriction
It should be noted that the Newnan Corporation's cancellation effort was somewhat halfhearted.
It merely pointed to high generic usage in trade publications and dictionaries without introducing
consumer surveys to prove the public perception of the term as generic. Id. at 586-87. As will be
discussed below, the burden of proving that a term is generic is great, and consumer surveys offer
the best means of meeting that burden. See note 55 infra.
12. See note 8 supra.
13. See generally Ball, Government Versus Tradentarks: Today-Pharmaceuticals, Realemon
and Formica-Tomorrow?, 68 Trademark Rep. 471 (1978); Shipley, Generic Trademarks, the
FTC and the Lanham Act: Covering the Market with Formica, 20 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1 (1978);
Margulies, How the FTC Threatens Trademarks, N.Y. Times, May 20, 1979, § 3, at 16, col. 3;
id. June 2, 1978, § 4, at 13, col. 6.
14. 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), reprinted in [1979] Pat. T.M. & Copyright J. (BNA) § A, at
5 (May 3).
15. The bill does not eliminate all of the FTC's authority under § 14. It only inserts the
following language at the end of the FTC proviso, see note 7 supra: "except that the Federal
Trade Commission shall not have any authority to make such an application to cancel solely on
the ground that any registered mark has become the common descriptive name of an article or
substance." H.R. 3685, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1979), reprinted in [1979] Pat. T.M. &
Copyright J. (BNA) § A, at 5 (May 3). The Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the
Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary held hearings on this measure
on October 17 and 18, 1979. Hearings, supra note 9. At the time of this writing, no further action
has been taken.
16. See [1979] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) § A, at 24 (Nov. 29).
17. See H.R. 2313, 96th Cong., 1st Se-s. (1979), reprinted in [19791 Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) § G, at 1 (Dec. 6). The authorization bill represents the culmination of what has been
described as "one of the most sweeping attacks on a regulatory agency in modern times." [1979]
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) § A, at 20 (Oct 23).
18. Section 304 provides: "The Federal Trade Commission shall not have any authority to use
any funds which are authorized to be appropriathd to carry out the Federal Trade Commission
Act for fiscal year 1980, 1981, or 1982 for the purpose of taking any action under section 14 of the
... Lanham Trademark Act, with respect to the cancellation of the registration of any mark on
the ground that such mark has become the common descriptive name of an article or substance."
H.R. 2313, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 304 (1979) (citation omitted), reprinted in [1979] Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) § G, at 8-9 (Dec. 6). Section 304, which has been called the "Formica
amendment," became part of the FTC authorization bill when the House Committee on
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extends over the three year life of the bill and if enacted, 19 will probably force
the FTC to discontinue its effort to cancel the FORMICA registration.
The purpose of this Comment is to examine the reasons the law does not
protect trademarks that have become generic; the history of the FTC proviso;
the effectiveness of the cancellation proceeding as a way to allow competitors
to use the generic term as the name of their products; the alternatives to FTC
action; the objectives of the FTC in petitioning to cancel registrations; and to
suggest that, at the present time, it is undesirable to preclude the FTC from
petitioning to cancel a registration on the grounds of genericness.
I. BACKGROUND: GENERIC TERMS AND THE HISTORY OF THE FTC
PROVISO
A. Trademarks and Generic Terms
1. Trademarks In General
Trademark protection 20 evolved from the common law of unfair competi-
tion. 2 1 Although a trademark owner does not obtain a monopoly over a trade-
Interstate and Foreign Commerce voted to insert it. [1979] Cong. Q. Weekly Reps. 973 (May 19).
Representative Luken of Ohio, the amendment's sponsor, "made it clear his concern was to
protect Formica." Id. He argued that the FTC's initiative was a" 'penalty on success'," id., and
that government funds should not be utilized to rescind trademark protection "just because the
company had done a good job and was well-known." Id. Others, however, resented this attempt
to protect one company, see [1979] Pat. T.M. & Copyright J. (BNA) § A, at 9 (May 17), and
when the entire bill was reported without hearings on the "Formica amendment," this resentment
increased. Notably, Alfred Dougherty has criticized the Congressional handling of the "Formica
amendment" because it "employs an ad hoc approach without benefit of hearings and thorough
study." Address by Alfred F. Dougherty, Jr. before the Boston Bar Association 11 (June 28, 1979)
(on file with the Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Dougherty Speech]. He noted that
"[tihis course appears to be struck at the behest of a single, albeit large and powerful company
[Formica], which is the respondent in the ongoing litigation which the budgetary restraints would
seek to scuttle." Id. See also H.R. Rep. No. 181, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. 42-43 (1979) (dissenting
views of Rep. Dingell); Letter from FTC to Rep. Sheuer (May 9, 1979), reprinted in H.R. Rep.
No. 181, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1979) [hereinafter cited as FTC Letter].
19. In February, 1980, the Senate passed its version of the FTC authorization bill. N.Y.
Times, Feb. 7, 1980, § D, at 1, col. 4; see S. 1991, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), Although this
legislation restricts the Commissioner's powers, it differs from H.R. 2313, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979), reprinted in [1979] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) § G, at 1 (Dec, 6). in several
important respects, including the fact that it does not preclude the use of funds to initiate and
maintain cancellation proceedings under the Lanham Act. See S. Rep. No. 500, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979), reprinted in [1980] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 3-4 (Spec. Supp. Jan. 3). It
has been noted that these differences "provide the seeds for future disagreements in [the
Conference Committee that will eventually have to resolve them] and raise the spectre of a
presidential veto." [1979] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) § A, at 6 (Dec. 6).
20. The Lanham Act defines a trademark as "any word, name, symbol, or device or any
combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and
distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by others." Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. §
1127 (1976). As this definition indicates, trademark rights are established by use and not merely
by adoption. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918); Hanover Star
Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916); see note 2 supra. If a trademark is abandoned It
is not entitled to legal protection. See, e.g., Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1976) (definition
of abandonment); id. § 14(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1976) (a registration may be cancelled at any
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mark similar to that for a patent or copyright, '22 it enjoys the exclusive right to
use the mark in connection with particular goods. For example, SANKA is a
trademark for a particular brand of decaffeinated coffee. If someone uses that
term without the trademark owner's consent in connection with similar goods,
an action will lie for trademark infringement.
2 3
The law protects trademarks because of the societal determination that they
serve an important economic function. 24 In 1945, the House Committee on
Patents described trademarks as
the essence of competition, because they make possible a choice between competing
articles by enabling the buyer to distinguish one from the other. Trade-marks encour-
age the maintenance of quality by securing to the producer the benefit of the good
reputation which excellence creates. To protect trade-marks, therefore, is to protect
the public from deceit, to foster fair competition, and to secure to the business com-
munity the advantages of reputation and goodwill by preventing their diversion from
those who have created them to those who have not. 25
In essence, exclusive rights to use a trademark are granted in return for the
performance of beneficial functions. If a term cannot, or ceases to, perform
those functions, it is logical not to provide trademark protection. Generic
terms fall within the unprotected category.2 6
time if the mark has been abandoned). For a comprehensive treatment of the law of trademarks,
see L. Amdur, Trade-Mark Law and Practice (Lanham Act ed. 1948); 3 R. Callmann, The Law
of Unfair Competition Trademarks and Monopolies (3d ed. 1967); J. Gilson, Trademark
Protection and Practice (1979); J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition (1973); E.
Vandenburgh, Trademark Law and Procedure (2d ed. 1968).
21. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918); Hanover Star
Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916).
22. Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924); United Drug Co. v. Theodore
Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97-98 (1918); McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 254 (1877); Amp Inc.
v. Foy, 540 F.2d 1181, 1183 (4th Cir. 1976).
23. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97-98 (1918); Hanover Star
Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916); McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 252 (1877).
For a detailed analysis of trademark infringement, see 3 R. Callmann, supra note 20, § 80-86; 1
J. Gilson, supra note 20, §§ 5.01-.09, §§ 8.01-. 12; 2 J. McCarthy, supra note 20, chs. 23-25,
30-33.
24. The conception that trademarks serve a beneficial function is not universally shared. One
commentator has noted that the utility of trademarks began to be questioned in the 1930's by
Edward Chamberlin and Joan Robinson. Ball, supra note 13, at 471-72. These economists called
for standardized methods of production resulting in interchangeable goods. "With quality thus
eliminated as a major consideration in the competitive process, price would remain as the only
valid basis for comparison between the products of different manufacturers. Trademarks ob-
structed the realization of this 'perfect' form of competition." Id. at 471. They also contributed to
irrational consumer choices and allowed producers to charge more for a trademarked product. Id.
at 471-72; see E. Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition 57-64, 270-74 (8th ed.
1962). See generally Scherer, Book Review, 86 Yale L.J. 974, 998-1000 (1977).
25. H.R. Rep. No. 219, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1945); see United Drug Co. v. Theodore
Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918); Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412
(1916); McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 254 (1877); 3 R. Callmann, supra note 20, § 65; 1 J.
Gilson, supra note 20, § 1.03; 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 20, §§ 3:1-:5; Hanak, The Quality
Assurance Function of Trademarks, 43 Fordham L. Rev. 363 (1974); Lunsford, Consumers and
Trademarks: The Function of Trademarks in the Market Place, 64 Trademark Rep. 75 (1974).
26. Feathercombs, Inc. v. Solo Prods. Corp., 306 F.2d 251, 256 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371
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2. Generic Terms
A generic term 27 "is the name of a particular genus or class of things or a
member of such a class. It is denominative in character, is ordinarily a noun,
and it answers the questions 'What is it?' or 'What do you call it?' ,28 The
word "car," for example, is the generic name for a particular class of motor
vehicles. A generic term cannot function as a trademark because, by
definition, it identifies a product to the public, but does not identify the pro-
ducer of the goods or distinguish them from others. 29
Several commentators and FTC spokesmen have pointed out that the pro-
tection of generic terms might have deleterious effects on consumers and com-
petition.30 For example, competitors or potential competitors would be de-
prived of the ability to market the product by using the word that consumers
believe represents the product's name. 31 These businessmen would have to
spend more on advertising to convince the public that their products are
functionally equivalent to the one whose label bears the generic term. 32 In
addition, to induce customer experimentation, they might have to sell their
product at a price lower than that attributable to normal competition. 33 Thus,
it is conceivable that the protection of generic terms creates artificial barriers
to competition and discourages new entry into the market.34
U.S. 910 (1962); In re G. D. Searle, 360 F.2d 650, 653 (C.C.P.A. 1966); In re Marlo's, 182
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 512 (T.T.A.B. 1974); Hearings, supra note 9 (statements of Sidney Diamond at
21, Alfred Dougherty at 8); Trade-Marks: Hearings on H.R. 82 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on Patents, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 59 [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings on H.R. 82]
(statement of the Justice Department); Address by Paul Rand Dixon, United States Trademark
Association Annual Meeting (May 11, 1978), reprinted in 68 Trademark Rep. 463 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Dixon Speech]; Dougherty Speech, supra note 18, at 3.
27. See generally 3 R. Callmann, supra note 20, § 74; 1 J. Gilson, supra note 20, § 2.02; 1 J.
McCarthy, supra note 20, §§ 12:1-:18.
28. 1 J. Gilson, supra note 20, § 2.02, at 2-8 to -8.1.
29. See note 26 supra. In addition, there is no justification for giving someone the exclusive
right to use a generic term because, as such, it is part of the language, see Hearings, supra note 9
(statement of Sidney Diamond at 21), and should be available for everyone's use. See King-Seeley
Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577, 581 (2d Cir. 1963); Senate Hearings on H.R.
82, supra note 26, at 59 (statement of the Justice Department).
30. Hearings, supra note 9 (statements of John Brezina at 3-4; Alfred Dougherty at 4; Andrew
Maguire at 4); Dixon Speech, supra note 26, at 465. Dougherty Speech, supra note 18, at 4;
Address by J. Thomas McCarthy, John Marshall Annual Conference on Intellectual Property
Law 15-16 (February 23, 1979) (on file with Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter cited as
McCarthy Speech].
31. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111. 117 (1938); Bayer Co. v. United Drug
Co., 272 F. 505, 513-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1921); Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Alfred Dougherty
at 4-5); Dixon Speech, supra note 26, at 466; Dougherty Speech, supra note 18, at 4; McCarthy
Speech, supra note 30, at 15-16; see Senate Hearings on H.R. 82, supra note 26, at 61 (statement
of the Justice Department).
32. Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Alfred Dougherty at 4-5); Dixon Speech, supra note
26, at 466.
33. Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Alfred Dougherty at 5).
34. Id. (statement of Alfred Dougherty at 4-5); Dixon Speech, supra note 26, at 466;
McCarthy Speech, supra note 30, at 15-16; accord, Senate Hearings on H.R. 82, supra note 26, at
61 (statement of the Justice Department).
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Most important, however, is the effect of a generic term on the consumer.
Its use as a trademark might confuse consumers who will be "misled as to the
function of the word. ' 3s The informational value of advertising will be dis-
torted, as will consumer purchasing decisions, 36 because people might be will-
ing to pay more for the trademarked product than for something other than
what they believe is the "real thing."137
Accordingly, Congress and the courts have traditionally refused to grant
exclusive trademark rights in a generic term. 38 This principle developed at
common law39 and has continued under the Lanham Act4" so that a generic
term cannot be federally registered as a trademark. 4 1 Moreover, it is possible
for a trademark that was originally valid and distinct to degenerate into a
35. Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Andrew Maguire at 3); cf. 17 Vand. L. Rev. 620,
625-26 (1964) (protection of the consumer was the rationale underlying the decision that the
trademark THERMOS had become generic).
36. Dixon Speech, supra note 26, at 466; Dougherty Speech, supra note 18, at 4; McCarthy
Speech, supra note 30, at 15.
37. Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Alfred Dougherty at 4); Dixon Speech, supra note 26,
at 465. In his speech, Paul Dixon of the FTC proferred the following hypothetical conversation to
illustrate this possible confusion. The setting is 1920, one year before the trademark ASPIRIN
was adjudged to have become generic.
"Consumer: 'I'd like some aspirin, please.'
Pharmacist: 'That'll be 10 cents for a box of Bayer Aspirin, sir.'
Consumer: 'Well, I was sort of hoping to spend a little less ... '
Pharmacist: 'Let's see now, we have some very fine Brand X acetyl salicylic acid in tablet form,
for only 8 cents.'
Consumer: 'But I don't want any silly sally acid, I want aspirin.'
Pharmacist: 'Well, sir, it's really just about the same thing.'
Consumer: 'Then why isn't it called aspirin?' "
Id. Dixon noted that even if the consumer eventually figured things out, "it is clear that a generic
trademark throws a major roadblock in the way of rational, efficient consumer decision making."
Id. at 466; see Dougherty Speech, supra note 18, at 3.
38. A generic term should be distinguished from a descriptive term. A descriptive term "is
ordinarily an adjective or adverb which may be used to describe the functions, characteristics,
size, weight, dimensions, uses, or components of a product to one who has never seen it and does
not know what it is." I J. Gilson, supra note 20, § 2.02, at 2-8.1 (footnote omitted). The
importance of the distinction rests with the fact that, although a descriptive term is generally
unprotected, see Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 311, 323 (1871); Lanham Act § 2(e), 15
U.S.C. § 1052(e) (1976), it may become legally protected if it attains secondary meaning. See
Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enarnel Corp., 305 U.S. 315 (1938); Lanham Act § 2(f),
15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1976). A descriptive term attains this status if "the primary significance of the
term in the minds of the consuming public is not the product but the producer." Kellogg Co. v.
National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938). Because this is the antithesis of the definition of a
generic term, a generic term can never attain secondary meaning. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co.
v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976); Weiss Noodle Co. v. Golden Cracknel &
Specialty Co., 290 F.2d 845, 847 (C.C.P.A. 1961). A generic term might have a de facto
secondary meaning but this does not entitle it to legal protection. Weiss Noodle Co. v. Golden
Cracknel & Specialty Co., 290 F.2d at 848; J. Kohnstam, Ltd. v. Louis Marx & Co., 280 F.2d
437, 440 (C.C.P.A. 1960).
39. See Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 311, 323 (1872).
40. Lanham Act §§ 1-45, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976).
41. Id. § 2(e), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (1976); see In re G.D. Searle & Co., 360 F.2d 650, 653
(C.C.P.A. 1966); In re MvLario's, 182 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 512 (T.T.A.B. 1974).
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generic term. 42 Many words that once possessed trademark significance have
since passed into the public domain and are now associated with the name of
a product. 43 These include aspirin, 44 trampoline, 45 thermos, 46 yo-yo, 47 cel-
luloid, 48 shredded wheat, 49 escalator,50 cellophane,5 1 and cola. 52
Nevertheless, adjudications of genericness occur infrequently53 because a
heavy burden of proof is placed upon the party alleging that a trademark has
degenerated into the common descriptive name of ihe product. 54 The chal-
lenger must show that "the principal significance of the word [in the minds of
the consuming public is] its indication of the nature or class of an article,
rather than an indication of its origin."5 5 Courts do not ignore the trademark
42. This process has been referred to as "genericide." I J. Gilson, supra note 20, § 2.02, at
2-9. If a federally registered mark becomes generic, the registration can be cancelled at any time.
Lanham Act § 14(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1976); see Haughton Elevator Co. v. Seeberger, 85
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 80 (Comm'r Pat. 1950). Genericness is also a defense to an action for trademark
infringement. See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938); DuPont
Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 601 (1936);
Nissen Trampoline Co. v. American Trampoline Co., 193 F. Supp. 745 (S.D. Iowa 1961); Bayer
Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
43. It is possible, albeit extremely improbable, for a trademark that has become generic to be
recaptured from the public domain. See I J. McCarthy, supra note 20, § 12:10. For example, the
trademark SINGER was declared generic by the Supreme Court in 1896. Singer Mfg. Co. v.
June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896). In 1953, however, a court declared that SINGER had
regained its trademark status and was entitled to trademark protection. Singer Mfg. Co. v.
Briley, 207 F.2d 519, 520 n.3 (5th Cir. 1953).
44. Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
45. Nissen Trampoline Co. v. American Trampoline Co., 193 F. Supp. 745 (S.D. Iowa 1961).
46. American Thermos Prods. Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 207 F. Supp. 9 (D. Conn. 1962),
aff'd sub noma., King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963).
47. Donald F. Duncan, Inc. v. Royal Tops Mfg. Co., 343 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1965).
48. Celluloid Mfg. Co. v. Cellonite Mfg. Co., 32 F. 94 (D.N.J. 1887).
49. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
50. Haughton Elevator Co. v. Seeberger, 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 80 (Comm'r Pat. 1950).
51. DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299
U.S. 601 (1936).
52. Dixi-Cola Labs., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 117 F.2d 352 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
629 (1941); accord, Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow Crest Beverages, Inc., 162 F.2d 280 (Ist Cir.), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 809 (1947).
53. Examples of trademarks that have survived a challenge on the grounds of genericness are:
ACRILAN, Thomas Pride Mills, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 205 (N.D. Ga.
1967); DICTAPHONE, Dictaphone Corp. v. Dictamatic Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 437 (D. Or.
1978); POLAROID, Marks v. Polaroid Corp., 129 F. Supp. 243, (D. Mass. 1955), aff'd, 237 F.2d
428 (1st Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1005 (1957); TEFLON, E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co. v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
54. Thomas Pride Mills, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 205, 208 (N.D. Ga.
1967).
55. Feathercombs, Inc. v. Solo Prods. Corp., 306 F.2d 251, 256 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 910 (1962). To establish genericness, challengers resort to such evidence as the actual
testimony of buyers, see Dictaphone Corp. v. Dictamatic Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 437, 445
(D. Or. 1978), dictionary or trade publication usage of the term as a generic word, id., and most
important, consumer surveys which "present a practicable way of introducing ... evidence [on
the issue of genericnessl." Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479,
490 n.39 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Surveys, however, must be conducted according to accepted judicial
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owner's interest in protecting the advantages that have accrued through the
cultivation of the mark. They "tend to favor the trademark owner and are
reluctant to hold that valuable trademark rights have been lost. ' s 6 Therefore,
the successful promotion of a trademarked product does not inexorably result
in the loss of exclusive trademark rights.5s
If this loss does occur, however, it should not be viewed as an unfair pen-
alty on the skillful advertiser.5 s Although an adjudication of genericness de-
pends upon the consumers' perception of the word,5 9 the trademark owner is
usually in a position to insure that the mark does not become a generic term. 60
In most cases of "genericide," the owner has contributed to the degeneration
of the mark by attempting, through advertising, to induce the public to asso-
ciate the mark with the product itself rather than with the producer. 6 1 Al-
standards or they will be given little or no weight. Dictaphone Corp. v. Dictamatic Corp., 199
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 437, 447 (D. Or. 1978); see notes 200-03 infra and accompanying text. A court
faced with the issue of genericness reaches its decision by determining whether the consuming
public views the word as having trademark significance. See Du Pont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed
Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 81 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 601 (1936); Bayer Co. v. United Drug
Co., 272 F. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). There is not, however, a fixed percentage of purchasers
who must believe that the word is generic before a court will hold that the term has lost its
trademark significance. Dictaphone Corp. v. Dictamatic Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 437, 445
(D. Or. 1978). For example, in American Thermos Prods. Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 207 F.
Supp. 9 (D. Conn. 1962), aff'd sub nom. King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321
F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963), the results of a consumer survey showed that 75% used the term
"thermos" generically, 12% thought it had some trademark significance, and, 11% used the term
"vacuum bottle." Id. at 21-22. The court was satisfied that the "great majority" of the purchasing
public viewed the word as representing the name of the product rather than that of the producer.
Id. at 25. On the other hand, in Marks v. Polaroid Corp., 129 F. Supp. 243 (D. Mass. 1955),
aft'd, 237 F.2d 428 (1st Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1005 (1957), the court stated that the
challenger "must show that to the consuming public as a whole the word has lost all its trademark
significance." Id. at 270 (emphasis omitted). It should be noted, however, that when determining
whether trademarks have become generic, courts do not "require the challenger to prove that the
continuation of trademark protection would harm competition or consumers; such harm [is]
presumed." Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Alfred Dougherty at 7-8). In essence, "once
genericness [is] established, the trademark (is] regarded as invalid on a per se basis." Id. at 7.
56. 1 J. Gilson, supra note 20, § 2.02, at 2-11. The evidence of genericness must be clear and
convincing, and ambiguities and doubts will probably be resolved in favor of the trademark
holder. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502, 523 (E.D.N.Y.
1975).
57. See Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Alfred Dougherty at 8-11).
58. Id.
59. See Du Pont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 81 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
299 U.S. 601 (1936).
60. "The argument that it is the public's and not the trade-mark owner's fault that a
designation becomes generic not only indicates an apathy to the rationale underlying our system
of free competition and the maintenance of free access of producers to the market but overlooks
the realities of the problem. The trade-mark owner has the power to determine how his product
shall be designated and advertised. Mere shrewdness in securing use of a term to designate a
product rather than to designate to the public the producer of the product should not be rewarded
by the grant of monopoly." Senate Hearings on H.R. 82, supra note 26, at 61 (statement of the
Justice Department).
61. See, e.g., Donald F. Duncan, Inc. v. Royal Tops MIfg. Co., 343 F.2d 655, 662-68 (7th
Cir. 1965); DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 76-80 (2d Cir.), cer.
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though this may be clever marketing, it may ultimately prove quite costly to
the trademark owner. To avoid this result, therefore, trademark specialists
have constantly advised trademark owners of the proper methods of trade-
mark management. 62 Alfred Dougherty, director of the FTC Bureau of Com-
petition, has noted that "trademark rights are conditional; it is the holder's
duty to preserve the mark's distinctiveness. " 63 By utilizing relatively simple
procedures, 64 the possibility of trademark degeneration can be severely cur-
tailed. 6
5
Although the FTC's action against the FORMICA trademark has generated
renewed interest in generic terms, it should be remembered that these princi-
ples have been applied since the last century. Few will argue that the owner
of a trademark should retain the exclusive rights for its use when a challenger
meets the difficult burden of proving that the mark has degenerated into a
generic term. 66 The provisions of the Lanham Act embody this principle 67 as
well as an innovation in the law that allows the FTC to petition to cancel the
registration of a mark for various reasons including genericness. 68 This
power, however, has been the subject of considerable debate both prior and
subsequent to its incorporation into the trademark law.
B. History of the FTC Proviso
1. Pre-1946 History: Origins of the Proviso
The Lanham Act of 194669 is the product of several years of Congressional
effort characterized by a cycle of hearings, suggestions, and amendments to
various versions of the trademark bill. The process commenced in 1938 when
Representative Lanham introduced H.R. 9041.70 Subsequently, six other
denied, 299 U.S. 601 (1936); American Thermos Prods. Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 207 F.
Supp. 9, 12-14 (D. Conn. 1962), aff'd sub nom. King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus.,
Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963); Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 510-12 (S.D.N.Y.
1921).
62. See, e.g., 3 R. Callmann, supra note 20, § 74.2; 1 J. Gilson, supra note 20, § 2.02[7); 1 J.
McCarthy, supra note 20, § 12:9; Diamond, How To Use A Trademark Properly, U.S.T.A.
Executive Newsletter No. 9 (1971) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
63. Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Alfred Dougherty at 11).
64. For example, when advertising, the trademark should be followed by the generic name of
the product; a notice that the word is a trademark should accompany the mark; the trademark
should be used in correct grammatical form, as an adjective and not a noun; and finally,
employees and consumers should be educated to use the trademark properly. Diamond, supra
note 62.
65. In recent years, companies have recognized the necessity of protecting their valuable
business assets, and have devoted increased attention to "policing" their marks. See, e.g,, Syntex
Corp., Syntex Corporation Trademark Guide (1978) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
66. William Ball has stated that "lilt is highly unlikely that any support could be mustered
among trademark owners or practitioners for the proposition that a mark that has truly become a
generic term should nevertheless continue to be regarded as a valid trademark," Ball, supra note
13, at 491.
67. See, e.g., Lanham Act § 2(e), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) 11976); id. § 14(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c)
(1976).
68. Id. § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1976).
69. Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946).
70. H.R. 9041, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938), reprinted in Trade-Marks: Hearings on H.R.
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bills 7 I received consideration before H.R. 1654 became law in 1947.72 The
proviso authorizing the FTC to petition to cancel a registration did not appear
in any proposal, however, until 1946 when the Conference Committee in-
serted it as part of a compromise to resolve the differences between the Senate
and House versions of H.R. 1654. 73
Throughout the evolution of the Lanham Act, opposition emanated from
various quarters because of the perception that the legislation favored big
business and had the potential for fostering monopolies. 74 The Justice De-
partment attacked the failure of the earlier versions of the bill to provide
explicitly that a mark that had become generic would not be protected by the
trademark bill. 75 Unlike the various Congressional committees, the Justice
Department was not satisfied that the sections on abandonment of trademarks
sufficiently dealt with whether a term had become generic in the minds of the
public. 76
Perhaps in an attempt to appease those with the view that the bill did not
adequately protect the public interest, a representative of the American Bar
Association suggested during the Senate Hearings on H.R. 82 in 1944 that the
9041 Before the Subcomm. on Trade-Marks of the House Comm. on Patents, 75th Cong., 3d Sess.
1 (1938) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings on H.R. 9041].
71. The six other bills were: H.R. 4744, 76th Cong., Ist Sess. (1939), reprinted in Trade-
Marks: Hearings on H.R. 4744 Before the Subcomn. on Trade-Marks of the House Comm. on
Patents, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1939) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings on H.R. 47441; H.R.
6618, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939), reprinted in Patents and Trade-Marks: Hearings on H.R. 6618
Before the House Comm. on Patents, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1939) [hereinafter cited as House
Hearings on H.R. 6618]; H.R. 102, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941), reprinted in Trade-Aarks:
Hearings on H.R. 102, H.R. 5461, and S. 895 Before the Subcomm. on Trade-Marks of the
House Comm. on Patents, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1941) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings on
H.R. 102, H.R. 5461, and S. 895]; S. 895, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941), reprinted in House
Hearings on H.R. 102, H.R. 5461, and S. 895, supra, at 29; H.R. 5461, 77th Cong., 1st Smss.
(1941), reprinted in House Hearings on H.R. 102, H.R. 5461, and S. 895, supra, at 14; H.R. 82,
78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943), reprinted in Trade-Marks: Hearings on H.R. 82 Before the House
Comm. on Patents, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1943) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings on H.R.
821.
72. See note 69 supra.
73. Conference Rep. on H.R. 1654, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 92 Cong. Rec. 7635 (1946).
74. 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 20, § 5:4, at 119.
75. See Senate Hearings on H.R. 82, supra note 26, at 59-62 (statement of the Justice
Department), at 138-50 (statements of Elliot Moyer); Trade-Marks: Hearings on S. 895 Before a
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Patents, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1942) [hereinafter cited as
Senate Hearings on S. 895] (statement of Elliot Moyer).
76. Abandonment occurs, inter alia, if any act of omission or commission on the part of the
trademark owner causes a mark to lose its significance as an indication of origin. Lanham Act §
45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1976). The various Congressional committees grappled with whether this
definition would make it impossible for a trademark that had become generic to be protected by
the provisions of the act. See, e.g., Senate Hearings on S. 895, supra note 75, at 18-53.
Apparently they believed that it would do so because a provision expressly governing generic
terms was not inserted until 1946. See S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sea. 1 (1946). Elliot
Moyer of the Justice Department, however, consistently voiced the Department's opposition to
this determination. See, e.g., Senate Hearings on S. 895, supra note 75, at 43 (statement of Elliot
Moyer) ("Abandonment, as I understand it, deals with the action of the trademark holder rather
than with the question of whether the term has become generic in the popular sense.").
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government play a role in the trademark law.7 7 After some discussion,7 8 the
subcommittee inserted two provisions allowing any government agency that
thought the public interest would be affected to oppose the registration of a
trademark and apply for the cancellation of a registration. 9 It was noted that
this action "would remove from the bill, and take from those who oppose the
bill, one of their most powerful arguments as to why the bill should be de-
feated." 80 Nevertheless, H.R. 82 did not become law.
One year later, in 1945, the House of Representatives, which had not given
extensive consideration to a government role in the trademark law, 8t passed
H.R. 165482 without a provision that expressly governed generic terms and
without any reference to government involvement. 83 The Senate's version of
the bill, however, contained a provision that dealt with generic terms as well
as one that provided that the head of any government agency could apply to
cancel the registrations of certification and collective marks in certain in-
stances.8 4 The Conference Committee modified the provision on generic terms
and the FTC proviso replaced the Senate's version of the government's role in
the trademark law.85
The history of the FTC proviso indicates that it was inserted to demon-
strate that the Lanham Act would protect the public8 6 because opponents of
the legislation believed that the public interest was being short-shrifted.
87
77. Senate Hearings on H.R. 82, supra note 26, at 138-39 (statement of Charles Allen). He
suggested that a government agency be empowered to oppose an application to register a mark.
Id. No one opposed this proposition, which on the contrary, was greeted by a mildly enthusiastic
response. See id. at 140 (statement of Sen. Pepper) ("It would seem to me to be a reasonable
protection of the public interest to allow a public agency or authority who thought the public
interest might be adversely affected to come in."). A representative of the Patent Office, however,
thought such a provision unnecessary. He noted that whenever an application for registration was
made, it was published in the Official Gazette, a copy of which was also sent to every federal
agency, so that someone could oppose the registration if appropriate. If any agency objected to
the registration, it notified the Patent Office which gave great deference to its suggestions. Thus,
he believed that this provision would merely codify an existing informal practice. Id. at 139
(statement of Leslie Frazer).
78. Elliot Moyer of the Justice Department viewed this opposition power as insufficient and
impractical. Simply stated, Moyer felt that it was unrealistic to ask government agencies to keep
abreast of the Official Gazette to prevent marks from being registered when they had sufficient
reason to do so. "Just the assignment of duties to all these agencies to parallel the functions of the
Patent Office provokes difficulties." Id. at 142 (statement of Elliot Moyer). As a result, Senator
Pepper suggested that the bill provide authority to petition for cancellation. Id, at 142 (statement
of Sen. Pepper).
79. Id. at 153.
80. Id. at 141 (statement of Chester Davis).
81. See, e.g., House Hearings on H.R. 82, supra note 71; House Hearings on H.R. 6618,
supra note 71; House Hearings on H.R. 4744, supra note 71; House Hearings on H.R. 9041,
supra note 70.
82. H.R. 1654, 79th Cong., Ist Sess., 91 Cong. Rec. 1718 (1945).
83. See H.R. 1654, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. § 14, 91 Cong. Rec. 1720 (1945).
84. See S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1946).
85. Conference Rep. on H.R. 1654, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 92 Cong. Rec. 7635 (1946).
86. See notes 74-80 supra and accompanying text.
87. See 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 20, § 5:4, at 119; notes 74-80 supra and accompanying
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Therefore, to placate the bill's antagonists"8 and to insure passage after eight
years of effort,8 9 the Conference Committee inserted the provision regarding
generic terms.90 Moreover, despite opposition from the United States Trade-
mark Association (USTA),9 1 the committee determined that some government
agency should be involved in cancellation proceedings. 92 Defending the Con-
ference report during the Senate debates, a member of the committee noted as
much when he said that "[tihe intent of Congress to protect the public from
the abuse of trade-marks and trade names was demonstrated by the adoption
of an amendment permitting the Federal Trade Commission to apply to can-
cel a mark. '93 This congressional concern for the public interest was again
demonstrated in the 1950's when, despite strong support for such action, at-
tempts to delete the FTC proviso were unsuccessful.
2. Post-1946 History: Attempts To Delete the FTC Proviso
The recent legislative attempt to reduce the FTC's power under the
Lanham Act is not a novel occurrence. In the years following its passage,
many commentators criticized the FTC proviso and predicted that the FTC
would use this new authority to harass trademark owners. 94 The most com-
mon objections to the proviso were that (1) the Lanham Act sufficiently pre-
vented the misuse of trademarks through mechanisms available to private
parties and there was no need for the intrusion of a government agency into
88. The Senate amendments to H.R. 1654 were viewed by businessmen and industrial leaders
as an attempt to assuage the Justice Department's opposition to the trademark law. N.Y. Times,
June 24, 1946, at 38, col. 4.
89. See 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 20, § 5:4, at 119.
90. The provision provided that a registration was subject to cancellation if the mark became
"the common descriptive name of an article or substance on which the patent has expired."
Lanham Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, § 14(c), 60 Stat. 427, 433 (1946) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1976)).
91. The Lawyers' Advisory Committee of the USTA notified the Conference Committee that
it objected to the Senate's decision to allow government agencies to petition for cancellation in
certain instances because it viewed the provision as an unnecessary extension of the government's
right to interfere with private business. Lawyers' Advisory Committee of the U.S.T.A.,
Memorandum of Objections to the Amendments to H.R. 1654, 36 Trademark Rep. 123, 125
(1946).
92. Instead of allowing any government agency to petition to cancel, the Conference Commit-
tee compromised by limiting it to only one, the FTC. Conference Rep. on H.R. 1654, 79th Cong.,
2d Sess., 92 Cong. Rec. 7635 (1946).
93. 92 Cong. Rec. 7873 (1946) (remarks of Sen. 0'Mahoney).
94. See, e.g., Carter, A New Day For Trade-Marks?, 36 Trademark Rep. 141 (1946); Digges,
The Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 36 Trademark Rep. 220 (1946); Martin, Incentites To Register
Given By The New Trade-Mark Act, 36 Trademark Rep. 213 (1946); N.Y. Times, June 29, 1947,
§ 3, at 1, col. 3, at 4, col. 3. It should be noted, however, that not everyone objected to the
proviso. Commissioner of Patents, Casper Ooms, stated that this innovation in the law would
probably be used infrequently, and he believed that there was no chance that "any legitimate user
of a mark will suffer any irritation or harassment." Ooms, Good News For Brand Advertisers, 36
Trademark Rep. 167, 172-73 (1946). Three years later Ooms wrote that "[apl of the agitation
about the dire results [of the FTC proviso] has left little substantial ground for apprehension."
Ooms, Trade-Marks From The Lawyer's Point of View, 39 Trademark Rep. 391, 391 (1949).
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the field of trademarks; 95 (2) there was sufficient authority under section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act9 6 for the FTC to proceed against trade-
marks being used to deceive the public or inhibit competition; 97 (3) the pres-
ence of the FTC's authority under the Lanham Act discouraged trademark
owners from registering their marks pursuant to the Act;98 and (4) the power
of the FTC to petition to cancel a registration placed an additional burden on
the inadequately staffed Trademark Division of the Patent Office 99
In response to these fears and objections, the USTA sponsored the Coor-
dinating Committee100 to suggest amendments to the Lanham Act, 0 '1 For the
most part, their suggestions were embodied in a series of bills10 2 that would
have eliminated the FTC proviso entirely. 1°- It was argued that the omission
was justified because the authority was a superfluous addition to the FTC's
broad powers under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,' 0 4 and
not even the FTC raised an objection to the deletion of the proviso. 105 Despite
the USTA's objection to the proviso, 10 6 the apprehension of businessmen, 10 7
and the FTC's failure to object to its deletion,108 however, these bills were
never enacted. 109
95. Digges, supra note 94, at 230.
96. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976).
97. Martin, supra note 94, at 217.
98. N.Y. Times, June 29, 1947, § 3, at 1, col. 3, at 4, col. 3.
99. Carter, supra note 94, at 142.
100. The Coordinating Committee consisted of representatives of 29 trade and bar associa-
tions. Hoge, The Lanham Act's Housekeeping Amendments, 52 Trademark Rep, 1245, 1246
(1962).
101. Id. at 1245.
102. See, e.g., S. 215, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955) (on file with the Fordhan Law Review);
H.R. 7734, 84th Cong., Ist Sess. (1955) (on file with the Fordham Law Review); S. 2540, 83d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1953), 100 Cong. Rec. 14068 (1954); S. 1957, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951) (on file
with the Fordham Law Review).
103. In addition to omitting the FTC proviso, S. 1957, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (1951), would
have deleted the provision pertaining to generic terms. See note 90 supra. S. 2540, 83d Cong., 1st
Sess. § 10 (1953), 100 Cong. Rec. 14068, 14068-69 (1954), however, would have retained this
provision. The last two bills, S. 215, 84th Cong., Ist Sess. § 10 (1955), and H.R. 7734, 84th
Cong., Ist Sess. § 10 (1955), although omitting the FTC proviso, expanded the scope of the
generic term provision by eliminating the "on which the patent has expired" language. See note
90 supra.
104. S. Rep. No. 2266, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1954).
105. Id.; see Perry, The Trademark Act of 1946 From the Point of View of Industry, 46
Trademark Rep. 511, 519 (1956). See generally Derenberg, The Seventh Year of Administration
of the Lanham Trade-Mark Act of 1946, 44 Trademark Rep. 991, 995 (1954),
106. See, e.g., Liddy, A Legislative Report, 40 Trademark Rep. 644, 644 (1950).
107. One author has written that the FTC proviso has "been troublesome to businessmen,
psychologically, if not actually." Perry, supra note 105, at 519.
108. See note 105 supra.
109. Professor Seymour Kleinman has recently stated that "certain controversial provisions"
kept these bills from becoming law. Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Seymour Kleinman at
3); see 4 R. Callmann, supra note 20, § 97.1, at 574 n.25. One of these obstacles was most likely
the proposal to delete the FTC proviso in its entirety because there was no such deletion in the
subsequent two bills.
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In 1960, S. 2429110 passed the Senate11 but was never acted upon by the
House. One year later, Representative Lindsay introduced H.R. 4333,112
which was substantially the same as S. 2429 and which eventually became
law."13 Both bills contained "housekeeping amendments"' 1 4 that were de-
signed to clarify existing defects in the Lanham Act without making major
substantive changes."15 There were no proposals to delete the FTC pro-
viso, 1 6 and since that time, there had been no further legislative attempts to
alter the FTC proviso until the present response to the Formica litigation.
At least one opponent of the FTC's recent initiative has stated that the
compromise nature of the FTC proviso made it "a hesitant extension, rather
than [an] express call for action by the FTC."' " Although this may be a valid
proposition, the history of the proviso suggests that, at the very least, Con-
gress intended to insert a mechanism to protect the interests of the consuming
110. S. 2429, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), 106 Cong. Rec. 14684 (1960).
111. 106 Cong. Rec. 14686 (1960).
112. H.R. 4333, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
113. Act of Oct. 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-772, 76 Stat 769 (1962) (codified at scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
114. Hoge, supra note 100, at 1245. According to Hoge, both bills represented attempts to
eliminate controversial matters that might adversely affect their chances for passage. Hearings on
H.R. 4333 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., Ist Sess.
38 (1961) (statement of James Hoge).
115. See H.R. Rep. No. 1108, 87th Cong.. 1st Sess. 2 (1961) [hereinafter cited as 1961 House
Report]. It should be noted that during the consideration of this legislation, the FTC took a
renewed interest in its role under the Lanham Act. Apparently, it felt that it could be more effective
if various minor changes were made in the text of the Act. See Letter from Paul Dixon to Rep.
Emanuel Celler (Aug. 11, 1961) [hereinafter cited as Dixon Letter], reprinted in 1961 House
Report, supra, at 11-12. Thus, the FTC asked that the wording of Lanham Act § 14(c). 15 U'S.C.
§ 1064(c) (1976), be changed from "becomes" the common descriptive name to -has become, prior
or subsequent to registration," a common descriptive name to insure that the registration of a
mark that was generic when initially registered could be cancelled. Dixon Letter, supra, reprinted
in 1961 House Report, supra, at 11-12. This concern stemmed from the case of Bart Schwartz
Int'l Textiles, Ltd. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 665 (C.C.P.A. 1961), which involved a petition to cancel
the registration of the trademark FIOCCO for various textile fabrics. "Fiocco" was also the
Italian generic term for the same types of textile fabrics. Although the FTC's petition was
successful on the grounds that the registration was fraudulently obtained, it could not petition on
the grounds of genericness because of the wording of the statute. 289 F.2d at 668. The FTC also
wanted the FTC proviso to be altered to negate the effect of FTC v. Elder Mfg. Co., 84
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 429 (Comm'r Pat. 1950); see note 8 supra. Although it sympathized with these
requests, the Committee found them to be inappropriate because the bill was "in large part a
housekeeping measure." 1961 House Report, supra, at 2. See also Message from President John
Kennedy to the United States Congress, 108 Cong. Rec. 4263, 4266 (1962), reprinted in N.Y.
Times, March 16, 1962, at 16, col. 8 (urging the Senate to allow the FTC "to apply for the
cancellation of any trade-mark which is, or becomes, the common descriptive name of an article
and thus should be in the public domain.").
116. In fact, the-most noteworthy change indirectly expanded the FTC's authority under the
Lanham Act. The change was in § 14(c) in which the registration of any mark that had become
generic, regardless of whether a patent had expired on the product, would now be subject to
cancellation. Act of Oct. 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-772, § 9, 76 Stat. 769, 771 (1962) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1976)).
117. Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Andrew Maguire at 6).
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public. Therefore, before eliminating a portion of the FTC's authority under
the trademark law, Congress should carefully consider whether the public
interest would ever be served by a government initiated cancellation proceed-
ing on the grounds of genericness.
II. THE USE AND EFFECT OF THE FTC's LANHAM ACT AUTHORITY
A. Use of the Section 14 Cancellation Proceeding
Against Generic Marks
One of the goals of the FTC, manifest in its petition to cancel the registra-
tion of the FORMICA trademark, is to have the mark declared generic so
that other producers of plastic laminates may use "formica" to describe their
goods. There are questions, however, as to whether a successful cancellation
proceeding" 8 can effectively achieve this result and equitably redefine trade-
mark rights to reflect the reality of the market place.
1. Inflexibility of the Cancellation Remedy
The first problem is whether cancellation on the grounds of genericness is a
sufficiently flexible remedy to do justice for all concerned."1 9 For example, a
term perceived to be generic by a majority of consumers might retain some
trademark significance. This situation occurred in Bayer Co. v. United Drug
Co. 120 when the district court determined that although the word "aspirin"
was generic in the minds of the general public, it had trademark significance
for pharmacists. ' 2' Therefore, the court allowed use of the word by compet-
itors for direct sales to the consumer, but not in sales to pharmacists. 122
Furthermore, in most cases, a court will fashion a decree to prevent deception
and confusion that requires competitors to use their respective brand names
with the generic term whenever they advertise. 123 Unlike a district court,
however, the TTAB does not possess this remedial flexibility.
Section 18 of the Lanham Act allows cancellation of a registration as a
result of an inter partes proceeding before the TTAB. 124 In the past this had
been interpreted to mean either "cancel entirely" or "partially cancel" a regis-
tration. 125 For example, if there had been a registration for aspirin, the
TTAB might have altered the register to indicate its validity only insofar as
the mark was used in sales to pharmacists. In Sef way, Inc. v. Travelers Pe-
118. Lanham Act § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1976).
119. See generally Shipley, supra note 13, at 23-26.
120. 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
121. Id. at 513.
122. Id. at 513-15. See also American Thermos Prods. Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 207 F.
Supp. 9, 27 (D. Conn. 1962) (court allowed the trademark holder to retain his registrations but also
allowed competitors to use the word "thermos" as the generic name for vacuum bottle.), aff'd sub
nom. King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577, 581 (2d Cir. 1963),
123. See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co , 305 U.S. 111, 120 (1938); DuPont
Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 601 (1936);
American Thermos Prods. Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 207 F. Supp. 9, 27 (D. Conn. 1962), aff'd
sub nom. King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963).
124. Lanham Act § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 1068 (1976).
125. Prince Dog & Cat Food Co. v. Central Neb. Packing Co., 305 F.2d 904, 909 (C.C.P.A.
1962); United States Steel Corp. v. The Nat'l Copper & Smelting Co., 131 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 397,
398 (T.T.A.B. 1961).
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troleum, InC., 126 however, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA)
rejected this practice. It interpreted section 18 to mean that in a cancellation
proceeding, the TTAB had only two choices. It could either deny the petition
for cancellation, or cancel the registration in its entirety. 127 Under Sef'way, the
remedial flexibility available to a court of general jurisdiction is not available to
the TTAB. Therefore, if the FTC successfully petitions to cancel a registration
on the grounds of genericness, it is necessary to examine the methods to avoid
this rigidity and to delineate the rights of the parties.
Under the principles of fairness and the law of unfair competition, a com-
petitor must adequately identify the source of his product when it uses the
former trademark as a generic word. -'12  If the competitor's identification is
inadequate, the FTC can fashion relief under section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act,' 2 9 which requires competitors to minimize consumer decep-
tion by clearly indicating the source of their products.13 0 In addition, the
former owner can bring an action for unfair competition if he believes that a
competitor was attempting to "pass-off' his goods as those of the former own-
er.
1 3 1
These problems can be simply avoided, however, by utilizing section 21 of
the Lanham Act to obtain civil review of the cancellation proceeding. 1 32 In an
126. 579 F.2d 75 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (3-2 decision).
127. Id. at 80-82. The court concluded that the discrepancy between Lanham Act § 18, 15
U.S.C. § 1068 (1976), and § 37, 15 U.S.C. § 1119 (1976), which gives a federal court the power to
cancel in whole or in part, is "another example of the difference between proceedings in the
[Patent and Trademark Office] and in the courts, [rather than as an example of] imprecise
drafting." 579 F.2d at 80 n.4. It appears that an argument can be made that the discrepancy
results from imprecision because other imprecisely drafted sections can be found in the Lanham
Act. For example, the FTC proviso in the Lanham Act § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1976), states that
the FTC can apply to cancel a mark when in fact, only the registration can be cancelled. See note
7 supra. In the dissenting opinion to Sey'ay, Judge Miller viewed the majority's holding as a
much too narrow interpretation of § 18. He argued that the legislative intent was not clear, and
therefore, the section should be construed in a manner that best facilitates the purposes of the
Lanham Act. He concluded that any of the powers enumerated in § 18 may be used in any of the
proceedings enumerated in the Lanham Act § 17, 15 U.S.C. § 1067 (1976). 579 F.2d at 82-86
(Miller, J., dissenting).
128. See Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896). Discussing the ways in
which a mark that had passed into the public domain could be used by competitors, the Court
noted that the word could not be used "to deceive the public, and, therefore, . .. the name must
be accompanied with such indications that the thing manufactured is the work of the one making
it, as will unmistakably inform the public of that fact." Id. at 200.
129. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976).
130. See In re Standard Sewing Equip. Corp., 51 F.T.C. 1012, 1055 (195).
131. This course of action was taken in Miller Brewing Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 605
F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3537 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1980) (No. 79-837). The court
held, however, that the defendant was not guilty of unfair competition because it had adequately
described the source of its product. 605 F.2d at 997-98.
132. Lanham Act § 21(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(1) (1976). A party to a cancellation proceed-
ing that is dissatisfied with the decision of the TTAB may either (1) appeal to the CCPA, Lanham
Act § 21(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(1) (1976), or, (2) obtain civil review in a federal district court.
Id. § 21(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(1) (1976). If one party files an appeal with the CCPA,
however, the other may override this decision by electing to proceed in federal court. Id. §
21(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(1) (1976). If appeal is taken to the CCPA, review is made without
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action brought pursuant to section 21, the district court can fashion a decree
aimed at minimizing consumer confusion. 133 It can also permit the trademark
owner to retain some exclusive rights in the word if the circumstances make it
appropriate to do so.134 The FTC has indicated that it will use this method to
seek review of the TTAB decision in the Formica case to negate the effects of
Selfway and obtain the remedial flexibility available only to a court of general
jurisdiction. 135
2. Collateral Estoppel Effect of the Cancellation Decision
The second problem inherent in the use of section 14 is whether a finding of
genericness by the TTAB will allow Formica's competitors to use "formica" as
the name of their plastic laminate products. Because the Lanham Act does not
establish actual trademark rights, 136 cancellation of a registration merely re-
sults in a denial of the benefits that accompany a registration on the principal
register. 137 Theoretically, the owner of a mark retains all his common law
rights, 138 and he can still sue for infringement albeit without the statutory
presumptions that lessen his burden of proof. 139 In National Trailways Bus
the introduction of new evidence. 2 J. McCarthy, supra note 20, § 21:6, at 12. Conversely, civil
review in the district court is in the form of a trial de novo. American Heritage Life Ins. Co. v.
Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3, 9 (5th Cir. 1974). Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Out In
America, 351 F. Supp. 537, 540 (S.D. Fla. 1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1973). Despite the
de novo nature of the trial, however, the TTAB's factual determinations will not be altered unless
new evidence is introduced that "in character and amount carries thorough conviction." 2 J.
McCarthy, supra note 20, § 21.6, at 14 (identifying this standard as the majority rule).
133. See note 123 supra and accompanying text.
134. See Lanham Act § 37, 15 U.S.C. § 1119 (1976); note 120-22 supra and accompanying
text. In the Formica case such remedial flexibility might be appropriate. Professionals such as
cabinet makers are the largest purchasers of plastic laminate products. See Hearings, supra note 9
(statement of Andrew Maguire at 8). Accordingly, even if the FORMICA trademark is adjudi-
cated a generic term, it is likely that these professionals are aware of the term's trademark
significance. An argument can be made, therefore, for relief that allows the Formica Corporation
to retain some exclusive rights in the word.
135. Interview with Paul Daw, Assistant Regional Director of the FTC, Denver, Colo. and
John Evans, Attorney for the FTC in the Formica Case, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 17, 1979)
(transcript on file with the Fordham Law Review). If there is concern that the FTC might not
seek de novo review, the Lanham Act can be amended in one of two ways. First, it can provide
for automatic review in a district court for the purpose of fashioning an appropriate decree. This
would be applicable only if there has been no appeal of the TTAB's adjudication of genericness or
if the decision has been affirmed by the CCPA. Second, the Lanham Act can allow the FTC to
petition for cancellation directly in a federal district court. Because the FTC has Indicated that it
will take this action to obtain broad remedial flexibility, the use of financial and judicial resources
could be minimized if the FTC is permitted to petition for cancellation on the grounds of
genericness.
136. See note 2 supra.
137. National Trailways Bus Sys. v. Trailway Van Lines, Inc., 269 F. Supp. 3S2, 357
(E.D.N.Y. 1965); see note 2 supra.
138. D. M. & Antique Import Corp. v. Royal Saxe Corp., 311 F. Supp. 1261, 1269 n.5
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); National Trailways Bus Sys. v. Trailway Van Lines, Inc., 269 F. Supp. 352,
357 (E.D.N.Y. 1965). Skil-Craft Corp. v. M. Lober & Assocs., 138 F. Supp, 313, 314 (SD.N.Y.
1956); Dwinell-Wright Co. v. White House Milk Co., 44 F. Supp. 423, 425 (W.D.N.Y. 1942)
(action under the Trademark Act of 1905), aff'd, 132 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1943).
139. For a discussion of these benefits, including the procedural advantages that accompany a
registration on the principal register, see note 2 supra.
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System v. Trailway Van Lines, Inc., 140 for example, the owner of the regis-
tered service mark, TRAILWAYS, sued for trademark infringement and un-
fair competition. Although the defendant successfully counterclaimed for can-
cellation of the mark on the grounds that it had been fraudulently ob-
tained, 14 1 it was enjoined from using the mark because of the plaintiff's
continued common law rights.
142
A different situation is presented, however, if the FTC successfully cancels
the FORMICA registration or other registrations on the grounds of generic-
ness. Such a finding would result in more than a mere denial of statutory
benefits because a generic term is not entitled to protection at common law. 
43
A competitor should be able to use the word as the name of his product, and a
court should give collateral estoppel effect to the finding of genericness, 44 in
the cancellation proceeding so that the competitor can use the term without
fear. that the same issue will be relitigated.
Recently, the rules that govern the application of collateral estoppel have
been liberalized by the Supreme Court's abrogation of the mutuality of estop-
pel requirement. 145 Thus, it appears that the issue of genericness would not
140. 269 F. Supp. 352 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
141. Id. at 356-57. The court was empowered to cancel the registration by § 37 of the
Lanham Act which states in part, that: "In any action involving a registered mark the court may
determine the right to registration, order the cancelation of registrations, in whole or in part,
restore canceled registrations, and otherwise rectify the register with respect to the registrations of
any party to the action." Lanham Act § 37, 15 U.S.C. § 1119 (1976). The use of this § 37 power
by the courts arises in cases of trademark infringement when the defendant affirmatively asserts
that the plaintiff's registration is invalid and should be cancelled, see, e.g., American Heritage
Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3, 13-14 (5th Cir. 1974); National Trailways Bus
Sys. v. Trailway Van Lines, Inc., 269 F. Supp. 352, 354 (E.D.N.Y. 1965), or in a declaratory
judgment action. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1976); see Simmonds Aerocessories, Ltd. v. Elastic Stop Nut
Corp., 257 F.2d 485, 490-91 (3d Cir. 1958).
142. National Trailways Bus Sys. v. Trailway Van Lines, Inc., 269 F. Supp. 352, 357-59
(E.D.N.Y. 1965).
143. See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 117 (1938); DuPont
Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 80-81 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 601 (1936);
Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
144. Conceivably, customer perception of the term as generic can change. In such a situation,
the doctrine of collateral estoppel should not apply. Because such a shift in public perception has
rarely occurred, see note-43 supra, this discussion will not include this remote possibility. Rather,
it will be concerned with the following hypothetical situation. The FTC successfully cancels the
registration of mark "X" on the grounds of genericness. Company B begins to use X as the
generic name of the product it sells. Shortly thereafter, the former owner of the mark, Company
0, sues B for trademark infringement. The issue is whether B will be allowed to use collateral
estoppel defensively to preclude the relitigation of the genericness issue.
145. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979) (offensive use of collateral
estoppel); Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971) (defensive
use of collateral estoppel to prevent a patent holder from relitigating the issue of the validity of
the patent). Mutuality of estoppel means that "unless both parties (or their privies) in a second
action are bound by a judgment in a previous case, neither party (nor his privy) in the second
action may use the prior judgment as determinative of an issue in the second action." Id. 320-21.
Under the "mutuality requirement," collateral estoppel can never apply after an FTC initiated
cancellation proceeding because the Commission would not be a party to the later infringement
action.
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be relitigated if it was disposed of by another court, 14 6 including the CCPA. 147
The TTAB, however, is an administrative tribunal, and some courts have
indicated that the TTAB's decisions, although entitled to great weight, are not
binding in subsequent litigation. 148 According to Professor McCarthy, the
underlying rationale of this notion is that "decisions regarding federal registra-
bility are not determinative of the common-law right to use.' 49 This rationale
is not persuasive in the case of genericness because when a mark has become
the common descriptive name of a product, it is not entitled to continued
federal registration, nor is it entitled to trademark protection at common law. ' 0
Moreover, a determination of genericness will not be made with any less
caution in a cancellation proceeding than in a proceeding in federal court. The
CCPA has noted that the TTAB should cancel a registration only with "due
caution and only after a most careful study of all the facts."'51 To sustain its
burden of proof, the party moving for cancellation must "leave nothing" to
conjecture.' 52 Therefore, the issue will have been the same in both the
cancellation proceeding and the subsequent litigation, the challenger will not
have had a more relaxed burden of proof, and, in all probability, the trademark
owner will have vigorously opposed cancellation to protect his valuable trade-
mark rights. 1
3
The basic question that underlies the application of collateral estoppel is
whether the party against whom it is asserted has had a full and fair oppor-
tunity to litigate the issue. 154 If it had that opportunity, the policies of pre-
venting the misallocation of resources,' 55 reducing litigation, and promoting
judicial economy,' 5 6 compel a court to recognize the collateral estoppel effect
146. See Miller Brewing Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 605 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1979)
(collateral estoppel precluded the relitigation of the issue of whether the trademark LITE was the
common descriptive name for low calorie beer), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3537 (U.S. Feb. 19,
1980) (No. 79-837).
147. See Flavor Corp. v. Kemin Indus., Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1114, 1117-19 (S.D. Iowa 1973)
(the CCPA is an article III constitutional court and its decisions should be given collateral
estoppel effect), affd, 493 F.2d 275, 281 (8th Cir. 1974).
148. American Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3, 10 (5th Cir.
1974); accord, Syntex Labs., Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 437 F.2d 566, 569 (2d Cir. 1971).
149. 2 J. McCarthy, supra note 20, § 32:30, at 480 (footnote omitted).
150. See notes 38-42 supra and accompanying text
151. Sleepmaster Prods. Co. v. American Auto-Felt Corp., 241 F.2d 738, 741 (C.C.P.A.
1957).
152. Prince Dog & Cat Food Co. v. Central Neb. Packing Co., 305 F.2d 904, 908 (C.C.P.A.
1962).
153. An example of such resistance exists in the present Formica litigation. Formica has made
every effort to retain its trademark registration. It began with a motion to dismiss the petition on
the grounds that the FTC lacked standing to initiate the proceeding. See FTC v. Formica Corp.,
200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 182 (T.T.A.B. 1978) (motion to dismiss denied); Formica Corp. v. Lef-
kowitz, 590 F.2d 915 (C.C.P.A.) (writ of mandamus denied), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2838 (1979);
see note 7 supra.
154. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326-27 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Labs.,
Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971).
155. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971).
156. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329-31 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Labs.,
Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 328 (1971).
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of the cancellation decision.1 5 7 Accordingly, if the genericness issue has been
fairly disposed of in a TTAB proceeding, relitigation should not be al-
lowed.1 5 8 A court should consider the policies that underlie the doctrine rather
than place reliance on such antiquated technicalities as the denial of collateral
estoppel effect to a TTAB decision.
Although it is possible that a court will not grant collateral estoppel effect to
a TTAB decision, the gravity of this situation is mitigated by two factors.
First, if the parties terminate the litigation after the TTAB's decision, the
original owner may be dissuaded from relitigating because of the knowledge
that it is extremely difficult to reverse the TTAB determination even without
a strict application of collateral estoppel. 5 9 Most important, however, is the
FTC's intention to seek review of the cancellation proceeding in a federal
district court.1 60 If there is a finding of genericness in this forum, it seems
unlikely that the former trademark owner, knowing of the probable applica-
tion of collateral estoppel will expend resources for a hopeless effort. There-
fore, the use of section 21 to obtain broad remedial flexibility will also elimi-
nate the problems relating to the collateral estoppel effect of the TTAB's
finding of genericness, and enable the FTC to use its Lanham Act authority to
equitably redefine trademark rights in the market place.
B. Alternatives To FTC Action: Suits By Private Litigants
Opponents of the petition to cancel the FORMICA registration view the
FTC's initiative as an intrusion into an area that had previously been un-
touched by government action.1 61 Perhaps the most frequently voiced argu-
ment against the FTC's action is that the task of litigating the issue of
genericness should be left to the private sector because private enforcement
has been demonstrably effective in the past. 162 It is appropriate, therefore, to
examine the various ways that a private litigant can challenge a federally
registered trademark, 163 and determine whether private enforcement alone
can provide maximum protection for the consuming public.
157. These policy considerations are only applicable when collateral estoppel is used defen-
sively as it is here. Slightly different policy considerations arise when collateral estoppel is applied
offensively. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329-31 (1979).
158. In his exhaustive study on the law of trademarks, McCarthy also reaches this conclu-
sion. 2 J. McCarthy, supra note 20, § 32:31.
159. See note 148 supra and accompanying text. When the Fifth Circuit noted that the
findings of the TTAB are not given collateral estoppel effect, it also stated that nevertheless,
"they will be accepted by the federal court unless the contrary is established by evidence which
carries thorough conviction." American Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494
F.2d 3, 10 (5th Cir. 1974). This is the same standard that applies to the TTAB's findings when a
district court hears an appeal brought pursuant to § 21(b)(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C §
1071(b)(1) (1976). See note 141 supra.
160. See note 135 supra and accompanying text.
161. See Hearings, supra note 9 (statements of Andrew Maguire at 2, Thomas Luken at 1,
Thomas Ward at 5); Ball, supra note 13, at 491; Margulies, supra note 13.
162. See note 161 supra.
163. This discussion will not take into account the possibility of trademark proceedings in
state courts.
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1. Methods of Raising the Issue of Genericness
Litigation of the issue of genericness often occurs as a defense to an action
for trademark infringement. 164 Because an infringement case is brought be-
fore a court of general jurisdiction, broad injunctive relief and remedial flexi-
bility are available,1 65 and the adjudication will almost certainly be given
collateral estoppel effect. 166 The only drawback to raising the issue in this
manner is the risk of liability for infringement if genericness is not found. 167
Another means to raise the issue is by initiating a federal declaratory judg-
ment action. 168 Before a court will take jurisdiction to delineate the rights of
the parties, however, the challenger must demonstrate that there is an actual
legal controversy between the parties "of sufficient immediacy and reality to
warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.' 69 Although this require-
ment is liberally construed, °70 it can preclude a party from raising the issue in
this manner. In Polaroid Corp. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 171 for example, the
court refused to hear Berkey's claim that the POLAROID trademark had
become generic because Berkey's mere desire to use the term created only a
theoretical controversy that was insufficient to warrant a judicial determina-
tion. 7 2 The court noted that "even though litigation need not be actually
threatened to procure relief under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, the
most liberal interpretation of justiciability will not admit to an active con-
troversy in the absence of either some imminent infringing conduct or some
assertion of the same.' 73 It appears, therefore, that to utilize this procedure a
164. E.g., Dictaphone Corp. v. Dictamatic Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 437, 438 (D. Or.
1978); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502, 509 (E.D.N.Y.
1975); American Thermos Prods. Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 207 F. Supp. 9, 10 (D. Conn.
1962), aff'd sub noma. King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir.
1963).
165. See notes 120-23 supra and accompanying text.
166. See notes 145-47 supra and accompanying text.
167. See Lanham Act § 34, 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1976) (if there is infringement of a federally
registered mark, the trademark owner can recover damages to its business, the infringer's profits,
and the costs of the action).
168. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1976); see, e.g., Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc.,
295 F. Supp. 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Thomas Pride Mills, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 155 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 205 (N.D. Ga. 1967). See generally 1 J. Gilson, supra note 20, § 8.03[21; 2 J. McCarthy,
supra note 20, § 32.17-.21.
169. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941); see 28 U.S.C. §
2201 (1976) (statutory requirement of an "actual controversy"). An actual controversy exists, for
example, if someone is charged with trademark infringement or has been threatened with an
infringement suit. 1 J. Gilson, supra note 20, § 8.03[2], at 8-19. There need not, however, be a
direct threat of infringement. "It is sufficient if such a threat is implicit in the attitude of the
defendant as expressed in circumspect language contained in a letter or if the plaintiff has notice
that the defendant asserts that there is or will be an infringement." Simmonds Aerocessories, Ltd,
v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp., 257 F.2d 485, 490 (3d Cir. 1958) (citation omitted).
170. Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 588 F.2d 895, 900 (3d Cir. 1978); Simmonds Aerocessories, Ltd.
v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp., 257 F.2d 485, 489 (3d Cir. 1953); see Muller v. Olin Mathieson Chem.
Corp., 404 F.2d 501, 504 (2d Cir. 1968).
171. 425 F. Supp. 605 (D. Del. 1976).
172. Id. at 608; see Universal Sewing Mach. Co. v. Standard Sewing Equip. Corp., 185 F.
Supp. 257, 259, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
173. 425 F. Supp. at 609.
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party must at least assert that it is about to embark on a course of conduct,
which under the circumstances, creates a reasonable apprehension that legal
action will be taken against it.
Finally, a challenger can petition to cancel the registration pursuant to sec-
tion 14(c) of the Lanham Act.' 7 4 If a party prefers to raise the issue before
engaging in conduct that would create a justiciable controversy, cancellation
is the only alternative. Although this procedure might be available to a
broader class of challengers, 17 5 the standing requirements of section 14 are not
without limitation.
The statute grants standing to petition to cancel only to those that believe
they are or will be damaged by a registration on the principal register.17 6 In
the case of an allegedly generic or descriptive term, damage is presumed if the
petitioner has a sufficient interest in using the term for its business.17 7 Thus,
an existing competitor of the trademark holder always has standing because
he is in a position to use the word as the generic name of the product he sells
if the registration is cancelled. 17 8
Standing'has also been granted in cases when there was no direct competi-
tion. In Plastilite Corp. v. Kassnar Imports, 17 9 for example, the respondent
had registered its mark with the Treasury Department to bar the importation
of goods bearing an infringing trademark,180 and the customs service ordered
the petitioner to destroy or return the infringing products it had in its stock.
The CCPA held that the petitioner had standing to challenge the registra-
tion'8 1 because of the mandate and the penalty assessed for noncompliance,
and also, because the importer would be deterred from purchasing more of
these goods.1
82
Trade associations have also met the standing requirements both in opposi-
tion proceedings' 83 and under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.' 8 4 In these
cases,185 the dues of the association depended on the total volume of its mem-
174. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1976); see Haughton Elevator Co. v. Seeberger, 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
80 (Comm'r Pat. 1950).
175. It is clear that only a competitor that desired to use the allegedly generic term would
engage in conduct serious enough to prompt an infringement suit. In addition, the -actual
controversy" requirement of the declaratory judgment action might, for the most part, preclude
anyone but the trademark owner's competitors from raising the genericness issue in this manner.
176. Lanham Act § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1976); see notes 1-6 supra and accompanying text.
177. Golomb v. Wadsworth, 592 F.2d 1184, 1185-86 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 63
(1979); De Walt, Inc. v. Magna Power Tool Corp., 289 F.2d 656, 661 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
178. See also Department of Transp. v. Scanwell Labs., Inc., 170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 174
(T.T.A.B. 1971), aft'd, 484 F.2d 1385 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (FAA granted standing to petition to
cancel the registration of a descriptive term because it had a sufficient interest in using the term in
its operations).
179. 508 F.2d 824 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
180. See note 2 supra.
181. 508 F.2d at 826.
182. Id.
183. Lanham Act § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 1063 (1976). An opposition proceeding is an inter partes
proceeding in which someone opposes an application to register a trademark. See id.
184. Id. § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976). Section 43(a) establishes a cause of action against
one who falsely describes the products he sells or falsely indicates the origin of the product. See
id.
185. Tanners' Council of America, Inc. v. Gary Indus., Inc., 440 F.2d 1404 (C.C.P.A. 1971)
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bers' sales. Because these sales could be weakened if no one acted, there was a
possibility of damage to the respective associations.18 6 Sections 13 and 43(a)
both have the same "belief in damage" requirement as section 14,187 and
therefore, it appears that this possibility of direct pecuniary damage will also
be necessary if an association seeks to cancel a registration.
It is unlikely, however, that consumers or their representatives will meet
the existing rules governing standing under the Lanham Act in general or
section 14 in particular.188 Although no consumers have attempted to petition
for cancellation, the Second Circuit, in Colligan v. Activities Club, Ltd., 189
has held that section 43(a) creates no right of action for consumers. After an
exhaustive study of the legislative history, the court concluded that "Congress'
purpose in enacting [section] 43(a) was to create a special and limited unfair
competition remedy, virtually without regard for the interests of consumers
generally and almost certainly without any consideration of consumer rights
of action in particular.'
90
Although Colligan has been criticized, 191 its rationale might preclude con-
sumer standing under section 14. If Congress did not intend to establish a
consumer cause of action under a broad remedial statute such as section 43(a),
it probably did not intend to do so in a cancellation proceeding. In fact, al-
though Congress recognized that in some instances the public can be injured
by a registration, it can be argued that Congress intended to protect the public
interest by means of the FTC proviso. 192
The rules governing standing, however, may eventually allow consumers to
petition to cancel, or perhaps, there could be a Congressional grant of
consumer standing as a substitute for FTC action. ' 93 Although this is arguably
an alternative mechanism for the protection of the public interest, several
factors must be considered. First, the cost of an action by a single consumer is
almost certain to be prohibitive. 194 In addition, a single consumer probably
(opposition proceeding); Mutation Mink Breeders Ass'n v. Lou Nierenberg Corp., 23 F.R.D. 155
(S.D.N.Y. 1959) (cause of action arising under § 43(a)); cf. Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Rexall
Drug & Chem. Co., 463 F.2d 1122 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (parent corporation granted standing in an
opposition proceeding under rationale similar to trade association cases).
186. Tanners' Council of America, Inc. v. Gary Indus., Inc., 440 F.2d 1404, 1406 (C.C.P.A.
1971); Mutation Mink Breeders Ass'n v. Lou Nierenberg Corp., 23 F.R.D. 155, 161-62
(S.D.N.Y. 1959).
187. Compare Lanham Act § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1976) with id. § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 1063
(1976) and id. § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976).
188. See Golden Gate Salami Co. v. Gulf States Paper Corp., 332 F.2d 184, 188 (C.C.P.A.
1964) (standing is limited to one with a "personal commercial interest rather than the interest of a
mere intermeddler").
189. 442 F.2d 686 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
190. Id. at 692 (footnote omitted); accord, LeBlanc v. Spector, 378 F. Supp. 301 (D. Conn.
1973). Contra, Arnesen v. Raymond Lee Organization, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 116 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
See generally Germain, Unfair Trade Practices Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: You've
Come a Long Way, Baby-Too Far, Maybe?, 64 Trademark Rep. 193 (1974).
191. See I J. Gilson, supra note 20, § 7.02[3], at 7-24 to -25.
192. See pt. I(B)supra.
193. The subject of consumer standing was raised by various Congressmen during the hearings
on H.R. 3685. Hearings, supra note 9 (unofficial transcript on file with the Fordham Law Review).
194. The consumer survey is the major expenditure for someone who seeks to cancel a registra-
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lacks the incentive to bring such a proceeding. If he believes that a mark has
become generic and perceives that the owner is charging a higher price for the
product, he probably knows that he can avoid paying the price premium by
buying an alternative product of similar quality. Moreover, because no
damages are recoverable in a cancellation proceeding, 195 the most relief that a
consumer can hope for is the betterment of other similarly situated pur-
chasers.
It appears, therefore, that a consumer cause of action would be utilized
only if a beneficent individual or a well-financed consumer group was willing
to bear the expense, 196 and it is doubtful whether such an alternative can
prove to be superior to a government agency operating as a public counsel.19 7
Although consumer standing can be made more viable by providing for the
recovery of costs by the successful petitioner, such action would be inequita-
ble to the trademark owner. The owner has not engaged in any wrongful
conduct and the cancellation results merely because the registered mark is
unworthy of legal protection. The conclusion that continued protection might
result in harm to consumers does not in itself justify the imposition of a cost
on the owner that is greater than the loss of the exclusive right to use the
trademark in connection with particular goods.
Therefore, under the existing rules, the issue of genericness will usually be
raised only by a party that has a commercial interest in seeing the mark pass
into the public domain. Those who support a continued role for the FTC
argue, however, that if these potential challengers choose not to proceed,
consumers and competition can still benefit from the initiative of a public
counsel. 
1 98
2. Disincentives For the Private Litigant
History has shown that private litigants are capable of challenging allegedly
generic marks. There remains, however, the possibility that a trademark that
the public perceives to be the name of a product will not be challenged.
During the controversy concerning the FTC's authority under the Lanham
Act, several factors have been identified that might deter a competitor from
raising the issue.
The first possible deterrent to a private party is the expense involved in
tion on the grounds of genericness. Such a survey has been estimated to cost between $20,000 and
$100,000. See Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of John Brezina at 7); id. (remarks of Alfred
Dougherty in response to questioning) (unofficial transcript on file with the Fordham Law Retiew).
195. See Lanham Act § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1976).
196. The class action device will not militate against this conclusion because attorney's fees are
usually paid from the recovery. See generally Note, Attorney's Fees, Unclaimed Funds, and Class
Actions: Application of the Common Fund Doctrine, 48 Fordharn L. Rev. 370, 374-76 (1979).
Because there are no damage awards in a cancellation proceeding, the costs would still have to be
borne by the petitioners.
197. Cf. H.R. Rep. No. 499, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-8, reprinted in [1976) U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 2572, 2575-78 (discussion of the ineffectiveness of consumer initiated litigation in the area
of antitrust violations).
198. See Hearings, supra note 9 (statements of John Brezina at 7-8, Alfred Dougherty at 14);
FTC Letter, supra note 18, at 31; Dixon Speech,supra note 26, at 467; Dougherty Speech, supra note
18, at 5-6; McCarthy Speech, supra note 30, at 17-18.
1980]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
litigating the genericness issue. 99 As discussed above, the most effective
means of proving genericness is through the use of consumer surveys.
200 It
has been estimated, however, that the cost of a survey that is properly
conducted to meet the procedural formalities and strict standards of objectiv-
ity required by the courts201 may range from $20,000 to $100,000.202 In
addition, one trademark attorney has noted that this cost increases because of
"counter-surveys, deposition testimony and all sorts of efforts to tear apart the
other fellow's survey, in addition to all of the other litigation steps."
2 0
'
3
Competitors may also be deterred by what economists call the "free rider"
problem. This phenomenon is aptly illustrated by the example of a lighthouse.
Although a lighthouse is beneficial to a fisherman's business, no single
fisherman will pay to build it because once constructed, the other fishermen
will use the lighthouse and receive a "free ride" at the builder's expense.
20 4
Similarly, this rationale might be applicable to the case of an allegedly generic
mark. 205 It is plausible that no single competitor will attack the mark because
the litigation would be costly and complex; it may not be successful; and, if it
is successful, all other competitors will be able to use the word without
contributing to the successful challenger's efforts.
Even if the monetary costs of the challenge and the fear of the "free ride"
do not deter a competitor from initiating a private suit, the resulting business
costs may outweigh the benefits that accrue to the challenger upon an
adjudication of genericness. For example, when each firm in an industry
possesses a respectable percentage of the market, and the firm with the largest
199. Hearings, supra note 9 (statements of John Brezina at 6-7, Alfred Dougherty at 14, 15);
Dixon Speech, supra note 26, at 466-67; Dougherty Speech, supra note 18, at 5; McCarthy Speech,
supra note 30, at 16.
200. See note 55 supra.
201. The admissibility of survey evidence is governed by the following rules: "The offeror has the
burden of establishing that a proffered poll was conducted in accordance with accepted principles of
survey research, i.e., that the proper universe was examined, that a representative sample was
drawn from that universe, and that the mode of questioning the interviewees was correct. He should
be required to show that: the persons conducting the survey were recognized experts; the data
gathered was accurately reported; the sample design, the questionnaire and the interviewing were In
accordance with generally accepted standards of objective procedure and statistics in the field of such
surveys; the sample design and the interviews were conducted independently of the attorneys; and
the interviewers, trained in this field, had no knowledge of the litigation or the purposes for which the
survey was to be used. Normally this showing will be made through the testimony of the persons
responsible for the various parts of the survey." Report of the Judicial Conference Study Group on
Procedure in Protracted Litigation, Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the Trial of Pro-
tracted Cases, 25 F.R.D. 351, 429 (1960) (footnotes omitted).
202. Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of John Brezina at 7); id. (remarks of Alfred Dougherty In
response to questioning) (unofficial transcript on file with the Fordham Law Review).
203. Id. (statement of John Brezina at 7).
204. McCarthy Speech, supra note 30, at 16-17 (paraphrasing P. Samuelson, Economics 49 n.3,
160 (10th ed. 1976)). McCarthy states further that the fishermen will look to the government to build
the lighthouse. "That's what government is for: to do the things that need to be done for everyone's
benefit but for which no one person will pay the whole expense, because no one person can charge for
it." Id. at 17.
205. Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Alfred Dougherty at 14); Dixon Speech, supra note 26,
at 467; Dougherty Speech, supra note 18, at 5-6; McCarthy Speech, supra note 30, at 16-17.
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share owns an arguably generic trademark, the other firms may permit the
market leader to retain its mark, its share, and even a possible price premium
for its product. They fear that passage of the mark into the public domain will
allow new competition to emerge that might, on balance, result in increased
costs to the existing competitors.20 6 This hypothesis might partially explain
the failure of any of these competitors to challenge the FORMICA trademark.
Alfred Dougherty has said that
[t]he plastic laminate industry . . . is highly concentrated. . . Despite continuing
market growth, there has been no new entry in almost 25 years, and import
competition is non-existent. However much it might benefit competitors to be able to
use the word 'formica', it would equally invite new entry and stimulate competitive
activity in the market. Underscoring . . . this point, a trade journal reported the
industry's concern that cancellation of the trademark would set off a 'price war' and
make the industry 'super-competitive'. In the same journal, an editorial observed that
Formica Corporation had customarily provided a 'price umbrella' for its industry
rivals. Competitors might rationally prefer to cluster under such an umbrella, rather
than take action which might promote its removal. 07
Nevertheless, some critics of the FTC's action dismiss these deterrents as
nonexistent. 208 In a recent article,20 9 David Shipley argues that the benefits of
successfully litigating the issue of genericness outweigh the costs because the
competitor can take "advantage of the market created by the trademark
owner's original advertising.1 210 He asserts that a successful cancellation
proceeding would result in "advertising costs [to the competitor that are]
limited to educating consumers to distinguish its own substitutable brand of
the product from those of the trademark owner's and other competitors."121'
Obviously, if a firm perceives these benefits there will be no need for
government action. Although this scenario may occur in most cases, it is quite
conceivable that a competitor may not view the benefits as Professor Shipley
believes it should. A small firm might not wish to expend resources in
litigation that may not succeed, 2t2 or a firm might foresee a higher resultant
cost after a successful suit. 21
3
To refute the notion of the "free rider" problem, Professor Shipley argues
that
206. Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Alfred Dougherty at 16-17); Dougherty Speech, supra
note 18, at 5. It should be remembered that under this set of facts, no legal wrongdoing has occurred.
It is merely an example of a company's perception that inaction is in its best interest.
207. Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Alfred Dougherty at 17) (footnotes omitted).
208. See, e.g., Kleinman, Trademark Genericide: Of Millers Brew and "Let There Be Light," 38
(1979) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Fordham Law Review). Kleinman calls these
"debatable economic assumptions, which appear to have been ransacked from someone's antitrust
nightmare." Id.
209. Shipley, supra note 13.
210. Id. at 16-17.
211. Id. at 16.
212. The fact that an adjudication of genericness is difficult to obtain cannot be overemphasized.
See notes 53-57 supra and accompanying text. Even if a competitor believes there is a good chance of
success, the possibility of failure will surely be taken into account when calculating the costs and
possible benefits of such a challenge.
213. This would be the case under the set of facts proffered by Dougherty. See notes 206-O7 supra
and accompanying text.
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[alIthough the benefits of a successful challenge of a generic trademark will be shared
by all competitors, these competitors still must incur substantial advertising costs to
establish their brands. These advertising costs minimize the effects of the benefits-
sharing problem [the "free ride"] and disarm it as a significant disincentive to private
challenges of the generic name.
21 4
This reasoning, however, does nothing to disarm the "free-rider" problem.
The essence of the "free rider" concept is that the challenger might be deterred
from acting because competitors will share the benefits of the resources he has
expended to prosecute the cancellation proceeding. Even though these com-
petitors will have to make expenditures to promote their respective brands,
the petitioner is still not compensated for his efforts on their behalf. 2 15
Shipley also points out that the "free-rider" problem can be minimized if
competitors join together and pool their resources to challenge an allegedly
generic trademark, 216 or if a trade association initiates the proceeding. 2 7
Although this will minimize or eliminate the problem, two further factors
must be considered. First, joint action will occur only if each of the compe-
titors believes that it will benefit from an adjudication of genericness. Second,
despite the obvious utility of such a procedure, this course of action has been
rarely undertaken.
2 18
A competitor might not be dissuaded from raising the issue of genericness in
most instances, but such a situation can exist. The argument that "if there is
214. Shipley, supra note 13, at 17 (footnote omitted).
215. Under this scenario, each competitor must spend X dollars to promote its respective brand.
The one who successfully litigated the issue of genericness, however, will have had to spend Y dollars
in order to finance the challenge, in addition to his expenditure of X dollars.
216. Shipley, supra note 13, at 17-18.
217. Id.
218. Perhaps competitors have not attempted joint action because of the fear that it will prompt a
counterclaim for violation of the antitrust laws. Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Alfred
Dougherty at 15). But see Pennex Prods. Co. v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 78 Civ. 2239 (S.D.N.Y.,
filed May 15, 1978) (Mercurochrome case). At the hearings on H.R. 3685, John Brezina outlined the
facts of this case which has not as yet been concluded. MERCUROCHROME is the registered
trademark for a first-aid antiseptic. Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of John Brezina at 4). Since
the 1920's, the mark has been licensed to various smaller companies that were allowed to use the
name on the product when selling to consumers. Id. In 1978, however, the licenses were terminated,
and the rights to market the product with the MERCUROCHROME trademark were vested in one
company. Id. at 6. Following the termination of the licenses, five of the former licensees brought a
declaratory judgment action, alleging in part, that the trademark MERCUROCHROME has
degenerated into a generic term. Id. at 6. Although this is an example of competitors "pooling" their
resources, Brezina takes the position that in this type of situation, considerations of economy and
justice would be better served by an FTC initiated cancellation proceeding. Id. He argues that
"[t]he owners of the registration of MERCUROCHROME virtually control the outcome [of the
case]. They can litigate vigorously, watching the expenses of both parties go up. If they analyze
the situation and if things look like they are going badly for them, they can simply offer the
plaintiffs a license for whatever consideration is necessary to cement the deal. The plaintiffs
would be happy to take it to end the litigation expenses." Id at 7. If such a settlement occurs, the
non-party competitors will suffer detriment because they are unable to use a term that is arguably
generic. Presumably, they too would have to initiate a suit in order to obtain the same treatment
afforded to their litigating counterparts. Brezina argues that this time and effort will be saved if
the FTC initiates a proceeding when this type of situation occurs again. See id. at 7-8.
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economic harm in the continued use of a trademark, there must be a
countervailing economic incentive on the part of private industrial users to
challenge the registrant 2 19 fails to recognize the possibility that the economic
harm is imposed mainly upon the consumer who, as a practical matter, would
be unable to mount such a challenge. "It is not logical to state that because no
competitor has successfully challenged the registration of an arguably generic
term, . . . consumers do not use it as a generic term." 220 Nor is it logical to
conclude that the public interest is not being affected because no competitor
has challenged the mark. The initiative of a public counsel might be a means
of obtaining benefits even though competitors have chosen not to raise the
issue of genericness.
C. Petitioning to Cancel on the Grounds of Genericness: The FTC's
Objectives
The FTC's renewed interest in its authority under the Lanham Act does not
result merely from a desire to protect the integrity of the trademark register.
Rather, it appears that the Commission's objective is to limit the exclusive
right to use a trademark if such action can increase competition and benefit
consumers. 22 1 For example, in the Formica case, the FTC foresees a ten to
fifteen million dollar savings for consumers if competitors are permitted to use
the word "formica" as the generic name for plastic laminate products.222
It does not appear, however, that the FTC will use this remedy hastily,
unnecessarily, or in an attempt to harass trademark owners. Before initiating
a cancellation proceeding, the FTC will conduct a preliminary survey to
determine whether there is a high degree of generic usage of the term coupled
with a limited perception of the word's trademark significance. 2 23 This would
be the sine qua non of the decision to proceed because without evidence of the
generic use of a trademark, an FTC challenge will be fruitless.2 2 *4
Moreover, the FTC has enumerated additional criteria to guide the selec-
tion of situations in which a successful cancellation proceeding can provide
public benefits even though competitors have chosen not to raise the generic-
ness issue.2 25 The FTC has focused on the extent to which a trademark may
219. Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Andrew Maguire at 9).
220. McCarthy Speech, supra note 30, at 17.
221. See Hearings, supra note 9(statement of Alfred Dougherty at 20); Dixon Speech, supra note
26, at468; FTC, Background on Generic Trademarks and Formica 2 (on file with the Fordham Law
Review) [hereinafter cited as Background on Formica]. See generally Craswell, Trademarks, Con-
sumerlnformation, and Barriers to Competition, Policy Planning Issues Paper (1979) (on file with the
Fordham Law Review).
222. Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Alfred Dougherty at 23-25); Background on Formica,
supra note 221, at 2. The FTC maintains that Formica can command a price premium because 401c of
FORMICA plastic laminates are purchased by the general public, many of whom believe the word is
the generic name for the products. The FTC believes thait this premium will be reduced or eliminated
if Formica's competitors are able to describe their products with the word "formica." Background on
Formica, supra note 221, at 2.
223. See Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Alfred Dougherty at 20); FTC Letter, supra note
18, at 31; Background on Formica, supra note 221, at 1.
224. See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
225. At the hearings on H.R. 3685, Alfred Dougherty noted that "the recent publicity regarding
the Commission's Lanham Act proceeding has prompted complaints to us from small businesses in at
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function as a barrier to intelligent purchasing decisions as well as on the
anti-competitive effects of the allegedly generic mark. First, if there is a
distinct and well understood name for the product other than the trademark,
the FTC might not proceed 226 because "It]he use of generic terms as a
trademark is a problem only if this prevents other sellers (or their customers)
from adequately describing their products.1227 Second, the product and
performance characteristics of the item must be difficult to perceive from a
simple visual inspection. 228 For example, when a consumer can easily ascer-
tain that a competitor's product performs the same functions as the one
bearing the allegedly generic trademark, the seriousness of the trademark's
role as an information barrier is considerably lessened. Third, the FTC will
determine whether the product commands a price premium. 229 Such a
premium might indicate a significant information gap because "[ilt could
easily be that, if consumers were fully informed ... they would not have such
a strong preference and would not be willing to pay such a premium. '230
Finally, if the owner does not occupy the leading market position in the
industry and if the trademark is apparently not acting as an entry barrier, the
FTC will probably not initiate a cancellation proceeding. 23 I The existence of
these guidelines indicates that the FTC will proceed cautiously with cancella-
tion proceedings 232 and that it will raise the issue of genericness only if such
action "would help to significantly minimize consumer deception and increase
market place information. "
233
least ten industries burdened by allegedly generic marks. The complainants have recounted tile
market impairment created by the marks and the difficulties attendant upon a private challenge and
have all sought Commission assistance." Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Alfred Dougherty at
26). See also Interview with Paul Daw, Assistant Regional Director of the FTC, Denver, Colo.,
and John Evans, Attorney for the FTC in the Formica case, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 17, 1979)
(transcript on file with the Fordham Law Review). In response to questioning by the House
Subcommittee, Dougherty stated that when such a request is made, the FTC will utilize these
criteria before determining whether to initiate a cancellation proceeding. Hearings, supra note 9
(remarks of Alfred Dougherty in response to questioning) (unofficial transcript on file with the
Fordham Law Review).
226. Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Alfred Dougherty at 20); FTC Letter, supra note 18, at
31.
227. Craswell, supra note 221, at 51 (emphasis omitted).
228. Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Alfred Dougherty at 20); FTC Letter, supra note 18, at
31. Mr. Dougherty has noted that" 'yo-yo,' although [adju&cated generic in a private suit) might not
have met this criterion." Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Alfred Dougherty at 20).
229. Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Alfred Dougherty at 20); FTC Letter, supra note 18, at
32.
230. Craswell, supra note 221, at 16; see notes 37, 222 supra and accompanying text.
231. Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Alfred Dougherty at 20); FTC Letter, supra note 18, at
32. Although a heavily advertised brand will usually not prevent new entry into the market, see R.
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 227-28 (2d ed. 1977), the existence of a generic trademark might
do so because it is difficult to advertise a product without describing it by the name that the public
knows. See notes 31-34 supra and accompanying text. The FTC believes that the absence of new
entry into the plastic laminate industry results in part from the genericness of the FORMICA
trademark. See Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Alfred Dougherty at 20); Background on
Formica, supra note 221, at 2; notes 206-07 supra and accompanying text. But see Hearings supra
note 9 (statement of Andrew Maguire at 7).
232. See McCarthy Speech, supra note 30, at 18-19.
233. Dixon Speech, supra note 26, at 469. Commissioner Dixon also noted that the FTC was not
"spending large quantities of time hunting for trademarks to attack." Id.
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Despite the existence of an apparently rational and well balanced program,
the FTC has been subject to extensive criticism for its initiative in the
Formica case. The first area of concern involves the motives of the FTC and
the propriety of using section 14 to achieve its objectives.2 34 Some opposition
234. It has been stated that using § 14 in this manner is neither "good sportsmanship, good
statesmanship [nor] good government." Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Andrew Maguire at 8)
(quoting an address by Seymour Kleinman (June 6, 1979)). Another argument propounded by the
supporters of the new legislation to limit the FTC's authority under the Lanham Act is that this power
is superfluous to the FTC's power under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45
(1976), to challenge trademarks that are used to deceive the public or impede competition. Hearings,
supra note 9 (statements of Seymour Kleinman at 4, Thomas Luken at 3, Thomas Ward at 5);
Shipley, supra note 13, at 27-32. Section 5 declares that unfair methods of competition and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices are unlawful, FTC Act § 5(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976), and it
authorizes the FTC to eliminate these practices if such an effort is in the public interest. Id. § 5(b), 15
U.S.C. § 45(b) (1976). This section has been utilized to limit or forbid the use of trademarks. See, e.g.,
Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944) (order to cease using the
trademark REJUVENESCENCE in advertisements for cosmetic creams because the name
implied that the cream could restore the look of youth); In re Standard Sewing Equip. Corp., 51
F.T.C. 1012 (1955) (order to manufacturer to clearly indicate the company's name when it used
the trademark UNIVERSAL because the mark alone tended to mislead the public as to the
origin, manufacturer and sponsorship of the sewing machine); In re Real Prods. Corp. & Realflex
Prods. Corp., 21 F.T.C. 714 (1935), aftd, 90 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1937) (order to cease and desist
from using the trademark CHAMPION for automotive products because the term had been used
as a trade name for the same products by another company); FTC v. Paul Balme, 4 F.T.C. 410
(1922), aff'd, 23 F.2d 615 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 598 (1928) (FTC holding that the use of
the name "Oreal" on henna hair dye products was an unfair method of competition and an attempt
to appropriate the good will of one who had used the term "L'Oreal" on the same products for
many years); FTC v. Royal Baking Powder Co., 4 F.T.C. 1 (1921), aff'd, 281 F. 744 (2d Cir.
1922) (order to cease and desist from using the mark DR. PRICE'S CREAM BAKING
POWDER unless "cream" was replaced by "phosphate" because customers were deceived that it
was a cream baking powder rather than the inferior quality phosphate powder). See generally
Carretta, The F.T.C., Trademarks and Public Interest, 45 Trademark Rep. 865 (1955); Millstein,
The Federal Trade Commission and the Excision of Trademarks, 55 Trademark Rep. 805 (1965);
Stockwell, Federal Trade Commission and Trademarks, 54 Trademark Rep. 500 (1964). The only
limitation on this type of remedy is that before "excising" or prohibiting the use of a trademark,
the FTC must be certain that a less drastic remedy such as qualifying language will not eliminate
the deception. Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 612 (1946); FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288
U.S. 212, 217 (1933). The FTC, however, has never utilized § 5 solely to declare that a trade-
mark owner has lost the exclusive right to use the mark because it degenerated into a generic
term, and it is apparent that those who argue that the FTC possesses ample authority under § 5
do not envision its use in this manner. Formica's supporters are concerned that the Commission
has not charged the company with any wrongdoing. See Hearings, supra note 9 (statements of
Thomas Luken at 3, Andrew Maguire at 1-2, Thomas Ward at 3). In effect, they argue that
before the FTC should be allowed to adjust a trademark owner's rights, it should allege and
prove wrongdoing that either inhibits competition or injures consumers. See Hearings, supra note
9 (statements of Seymour Kleinman at 4, Thomas Luken at 3, Andrew Maguire at 11, Thomas
Ward at 5). The suggestion that the FTC should be required to prove wrongdoing, however, is
unjustified because the law has treated generic trademarks as voidable for nearly a century.
Continued protection could result in public confusion and place competitors at an unfair
disadvantage in the marketplace. To concentrate on the fact that the FTC has not alleged any
wrongdoing in the Formica case unnecessarily diverts attention from the central issues. Whether
a public counsel should be authorized to litigate the issue of genericness, and whether the public
can benefit by such an initiative, are the questions that should be answered before limiting the
FTC's power under the Lanham Act. Moreover, the FTC might be able to initiate a § 14 type of
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stems from the perception that the FTC is attempting to eradicate the
function of trademarks in the market place. Critics argue that to achieve this
end, the FTC is using a two-pronged attack, compulsory licensing as a
remedy for antitrust violations235 and petitioning to cancel registrations on the
grounds of genericness. 236 Even if this characterization of the FTC's motive is
correct, however, comptilsory licensing237 should be distinguished from can-
cellation and the merits of each procedure should be considered separately.
In the case of compulsory licensing, the FTC is asserting that consumers
prefer to buy Brand X and that the preference has contributed to the
trademark owner's acquisition and maintenance of monopoly power. Accord-
ingly, to reduce competitors' promotional costs and to dissipate this monopoly
power, Company X will be forced to license its trademark to any competitor
willing to produce a product of equivalent quality. 238 The rationale that
justifies an adjudication of genericness, however, is inapposite. Such a
decision merely indicates that a word no longer functions as a trademark
because consumers associate the term with the product, rather than with the
producer.239 A significant number of purchasers might be buying the product,
not because of a genuine preference for that particular brand, but rather,
because their decision making is hindered by an artificial linguistic barrier. 240
Although compulsory licensing is used "to tell consumers what they should
proceeding under the authority granted by § 5. An adjudication of generichess essentially means
that the significant majority of the product's purchasers believe that the word lacks trademark
significance, and that they are under the impression that the term denotes the name of the
product. See note 55 supra and accompanying text. Because this deception is essential to an
adjudication of genericness, it can be argued that such a proceeding falls squarely within the
parameters of § 5. If the FTC initiated such action, however, the opposition would probably be
greater than the present reaction to the Formica litigation, see Interview with Paul Daw,
Regional Director of the FTC, Denver, Colo., and John Evans, Attorney for the FTC in the
Formica Case, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 17, 1979) (transcript on file with the Fordham Law
Review), because, among other things, the FTC is required to meet a burden of proof under § 5
that is lower than that required in a cancellation proceeding under the Lanham Act. See Milsteln,
supra, at 813; Shipley, supra note 13, at 30. See generally FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380
U.S. 374, 385 (1965); FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112, 116-17 (1937); Kalwajtys v.
FTC, 237 F.2d 654, 656 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1025 (1957).
235. Although the FTC has attempted to use compulsory licensing, it has not yet succeeded in
doing so. See In re Borden, Inc., 92 F.T.C. 669, 775, 808 (1978) (administrative law judge ordered
compulsory licensing of the REALEMON trademark but the majority of the FTC commissioners
believed that although this could be an appropriate remedy, an order prohibiting exclusionary
pricing would suffice to dissolve Borden's monopoly power).
236. See Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Seymour Kleinman at 10); id. (remarks of Thomas
Ward in response to questioning) (unofficial transcript on file with the Fordham Law Review);
Kleinman, supra note 208, at 38-39. See generally note 13 supra.
237. On the subject of compulsory licensing, see Craswell, supra note 221, at 26-49; Dobb,
Compulsory Trademark Licensure as a Remedyfor Monopolization, 26 Cath. U.L. Rev. 589 (1977);
McCarthy, Compulsory Licensing of a Trademark: Remedy or Penalty?, 67 Trademark Rep. 197
(1977); Palladino, Compulsory Licensing of a Trademark, 26 Buffalo L. Rev. 457 (1977).
238. See Inre Borden, Inc., 92 F.T.C. 669, 774-76 (1973); Craswell,supra note 221, at 20, 24-25;
McCarthy Speech, supra note 30, at 4-8.
239. See pt. I(A)(2) supra.
240. See Craswell, supra note 221, at 55-56; notes 35-37 supra and accompanying text.
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think or buy,"'24 ' raising the issue of genericness "merely presents the [ques-
tion]: what in fact do consumers think?"2 4 2
An adjudication of genericness is not a means to restructure a particular
market completely. 243 It merely removes an artificial barrier by allowing other
competitors to describe their products by the name the public knows.2 4
4
Competition among brands will resume and consumers who actually prefer
the former trademark owner's product will be able to identify it and continue
to purchase it. 245 This procedure, unlike compulsory licensing, is a traditional
method of redefining trademark rights so that they reflect the reality of the
market place. 246 It does not destroy our system of trademark protection and it
is doubtful whether it will do so in the future. If such a proceeding benefits
the public, the FTC should not be condemned for its new policy against
generic trademarks.
Nevertheless, opponents of the FTC action maintain that if the FORMICA
registration is cancelled, neither competitors nor consumers will benefit2 47 and
thus, the action represents a misallocation of the FTC's resources. In particu-
lar, the opponents have argued that allowing generic use of FORMICA by
competitors will invite the entry of unscrupulous businessmen who will use
the generic term to deceive consumers about an inferior product.2 4 8 It must be
remembered, however, that although they are allowed to use the generic
term, competitors will be required to adequately describe the source of their
respective products. 249 If a company attempts to make a quick profit by
selling an inferior product, consumers will most likely recognize the ploy and
penalize the manufacturer by refusing to buy the product. Professor Scherer,
therefore, doubts that manufacturers will be inclined to proceed in this
manner because "[rjecognition that one's product is identified by maker and
that a bad consumer experience will mean lost repeat sales should generate
significant quality-control incentives. 2 5 0 The possibility remains that con-
241. McCarthy Speech, supra note 30, at 11.
242. Id.
243. Craswell, supra note 221, at 54 ("Of course, the same factors which make cancellation a less
complicated remedy [than compulsory licensing] also make it a less sweeping one.")
244. See Craswell, supra note 221, at 54 ("Cancellation is designed only to eliminate the burden
on firms who have no other way to describe their products, and whose customers (or potential
customers) have no convenient way of asking for any product but the trademarked brand."); notes
30-34 supra and accompanying text.
245. See Craswell, supra note 221, at 54; Dixon Speech, supra note 26, at 469.
246. See pt. I(A)(2) supra.
247. See Hearings, supra note 9 (statements of Thomas Luken at 2, Thomas Ward at 5-6);
Margulies, supra note 13. Representative Luken has stated that because Formica's competitors
oppose the FTC's challenge, Formica does not possess an unfair advantage in the market and thus,
there is no justification for the FTC's action. Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Thomas Luken at
2). The FTC maintains, however, that the existing competitors in the plastic laminate market are
content to maintain the status quo because it is in their best interests to do so. See notes 206-07 supra
and accompanying text. Luken's argument fails to take into account the possibility that the trade-
mark is acting as an entry barrier or that consumers might benefit from an adjudication of generic-
ness. See Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Thomas Luken at 2).
248. Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Thomas Ward at 5-6); Margulies, supra note 13.
249. See note 128 supra and accompanying text.
250. Scherer, supra note 24, at 998.
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sumers will be faced with search or learning costs, 251 but this does not
preclude the potential for consumer benefit to result from cancellation, If
purchasers are paying more for a product because of a generic trademark,
allowing use of the term as the name of the product will better equip the
consumer to make intelligent decisions. Ultimately, the costs and benefits of
the cancellation proceeding should be weighed in order to determine whether
any initial confusion is offset by public benefit in the form of increased
competition and lower prices. 2- 2 It is premature, however, to assert that
neither consumers nor competitors will benefit if the FTC prevails in the
Formica case and that the Commission has abused its discretion by taking this
initiative.
CONCLUSION
The present Congressional response to the FTC's initiative in the Formica
case may stem from what Professor McCarthy calls the " 'religious war'
concept that nothing the FTC does can be proper,"'253 and thus, its powers
should be curtailed. Whatever one thinks of the FTC's other programs,
however, the use of its Lanham Act authority should be distinguished and
considered in the context of a less turbulent environment. If Congress is
concerned about the FTC's use of section 14, it should monitor the effects of
the Formica case. If FTC initiated cancellation proceedings prove to result in
relatively few public benefits, or if the FTC consistently fails in its attempts to
obtain adjudications of genericness, Congress can limit or cut off funds for
such proceedings in the same manner as the House has done in the pending
FTC authorization bill. Alternatively, if Congress has become disenchanted
with the FTC, the possibility of placing another government agency in the
role of public counsel to petition for cancellation under the Lanham Act
should be considered. Congress should take no action, however, until it has
carefully studied the facts. At present, enactment of either H.R. 3685 or H.R.
2313 is inappropriate because the underlying rationale of this well established
remedy indicates that the public might be injured by the continued grant of
exclusive trademark rights for a word that has degenerated into a generic
term.
John M. Fietkiewicz
251. Craswell believes that if there are search or learning costs, "they are likely to be small."
Craswell, supra note 221, at 55.
252. The FTC should recognize the need for such analysis. For example, Craswell suggests that
"it would... be useful to monitor the price of the trademark owner's product, to make sure that It
really is reduced by cancellation. . . . [This] will at least identify those extreme cases where the
trademark owner must engage in so much advertising to reestablish his reputation that prices end up
rising rather than falling. This will give the Commission some evidence of the effects of cancellation,
and better inform the use of that remedy in the future." Craswell, supra note 221, at 56 (footnote
omitted).
253. McCarthy Speech, supra note 30, at 15.
